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No. 1285

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SOVIET DISARMAMENT EFFORTS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 18 Apr 77 pp 3-9

[Article by N. Ponomarev and V. Zhuravlev: "The 25th CPSU Congress and the USSR's Struggle To Stop the Arms Race and Achieve Disarmament"]

[Text] Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party, stated from the lofty podium of the 25th CPSU Congress that "one of the main lines of foreign policy activity of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government has been and remains, as demanded by the Program of Peace, the struggle to stop the arms race, the struggle for disarmament."¹ Leonid Il'ich reaffirmed this clear and consistent USSR line in international relations in January 1977 during his talk in Tula. "Our policy is not a policy of superiority in armament," he emphasized, "it is a policy to curtail arms, to alleviate the military confrontation"²

The policy of peace and eliminating the danger of war flow from the very nature of socialism. Our socialist state has waged an intense and untiring struggle for peace, for reduction of armaments and disarmament, since the first days of its existence.

The victory of socialism in the Soviet Union made it possible for the first time in history to put the idea of disarmament and peace on real socioeconomic grounds. "Disarmament is an ideal of socialism," V. I. Lenin wrote. "In the socialist society there will be no wars, so disarmament will be realized."³ The class nature of Soviet foreign policy, socialist in its substance and objectives, made it a peace-loving policy. All the foreign policy activity of the Soviet Government since October has been aimed at implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries and resolving the problem of disarmament.

As early as the Genoa Conference of 1922, the first international forum in which the young Soviet republic participated, our delegation, under direct instructions from V. I. Lenin, posed, on a practical level, the

issue of universal disarmament and banning the most barbaric forms and means of warfare.⁴ In December 1922 an international conference specially devoted to disarmament was held in Moscow. The RSFSR, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland participated in it. The Soviet delegation proposed that participants at the conference reduce the size of their armies by 75 percent over a period of 1,5-2 years.

In 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations and used that podium in the interests of taking concrete steps toward disarmament, collective response to aggression, and rendering all possible support to the victims of aggression in Spain, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, in that period the Soviet Union was alone in its struggle against the military danger and arms race and was unable to achieve the necessary decisions in this area.

After World War II, especially with the appearance of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, the urgency of the disarmament problem became even more apparent.

In a new historical phase the Soviet Union's struggle for disarmament now took place in a different political situation: the world socialist system had appeared in the international arena and progressive forces who favored peace, security, and disarmament were stronger. In the postwar period the Soviet Union has consistently come forward with proposals on issues of reducing weapons and strengthening international security. It was the USSR which, on 19 June 1946 submitted the Draft International Convention Banning the Production and Use of Weapons Based on Atomic Energy for Purposes of Mass Destruction to the U. N. Commission on Atomic Energy. Relying on its obedient majority in the United Nations, the United States was able to deflect the Soviet proposals.

The Soviet Union has made major efforts to achieve agreement on reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. At the very first session of the U. N. General Assembly in 1946 the USSR submitted a proposal for a universal reduction of armaments and ban on atomic weapons with a guarantee of international checks on implementation of these steps. But the Western powers used every means to delay a decision on this pressing problem, advancing preliminary conditions which were unacceptable to the socialist countries and would have meant in effect the creation of a broad network of military intelligence and espionage in the territory of the states participating in such a disarmament agreement. This network would have been directed to preparing for aggression against the socialist countries. The Soviet proposal to disband military alliances and eliminate military bases on foreign territory was also rejected. All this ultimately led to complete stagnation in negotiations on the issue of disarmament.

The Soviet Union undertook new, vigorous steps to achieve progress in the disarmament field after the invention of the thermonuclear bomb.

In particular, on 10 May 1955 the Soviet Union introduced a proposal to reduce arms and ban nuclear weapons. In an effort to achieve a positive decision the USSR took account of the position of the Western powers, including their position on the issue of disarmament checks. But the capitalist countries drew back and renounced their own earlier proposals on this issue.⁵

The entire history of disarmament talks shows irrefutably that Soviet policy has been the moving force in reviewing and deciding this problem. At the 14th Session of the U. N. General Assembly in 1959 the USSR came forward with a proposal to conclude an international agreement on universal and complete disarmament of all countries. This initiative marked the beginning of a new stage in our country's struggle to rid humanity of devastating wars. The growth in the strength of the socialist community during that period created a realistic base for the policy of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems. Influenced by world public opinion the capitalist countries did not dare to openly reject the Soviet proposals this time. But they avoided adopting the concrete plan of disarmament proposed by the Soviet Government. Nonetheless, a resolution supporting the idea of universal and complete disarmament was approved by the General Assembly. This strengthened the position of the advocates of disarmament. The Soviet proposals were submitted for consideration by a Committee on Disarmament created in the summer of 1959 following agreement among the governments of the USSR, the United States, England, and France.

The Soviet Union made broad use of bilateral talks with governments in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America related to the issues of universal and complete disarmament and international checks on it. The activity of the USSR and the other socialist countries in this direction continually ran up against the endeavor of the Western powers to drag out negotiations and, under this cover, continue the arms race. While exposing the West's tactics, in particular at the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet Union did not slacken its own efforts. The Soviet draft Fundamental Principles of a Treaty on Universal and Complete Disarmament was submitted to the 15th Session of the U. N. General Assembly in 1960; at the initiative of the Soviet Union the heads of state and government of many countries of the world and ministers of foreign affairs were in attendance. The draft was supported by the socialist countries and the leaders of many developing countries. The General Assembly approved the exchange of opinions between the USSR and the United States on issues of disarmament. The text of a Statement of Principles which envisioned the necessity to agree on a program of universal and complete disarmament was worked out and approved.⁶

Soviet initiatives with respect to prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons, the economic program for disarmament, and many others were also very important.

Despite the obvious reluctance of the Western countries to agree to true disarmament, the radical change in the ratio of forces in the

international arena in favor of socialism, the transformation of the world socialist system into the leading force of the modern day, and the recognition by the capitalist countries of the nuclear parity between the USSR and the United States led to the establishment of a new atmosphere for negotiation and this allowed the problem of disarmament to gradually enter the area of the feasible.

A qualitatively new stage in the struggle to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament began in the 1970's. It was marked by the 24th CPSU Congress's adoption of the Program of Peace, which defined the grandiose objectives of Soviet foreign policy in the international arena. This majestic Program emphasizes that the Soviet Union favors conclusion of treaties which would ban nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and stop all nuclear weapons testing anywhere, including underground, and establish nonnuclear zones in different regions of the world. In this way, the 24th CPSU Congress laid out a concrete program of actions for Soviet foreign policy, a program aimed at activating the struggle to stop the arms race.

Disarmament questions were also a center of attention at the 25th CPSU Congress. It is noteworthy that 4 of the 12 basic principles of the foreign policy program adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress directly involved this precise issue. They set the challenge of achieving an ending to the growing arms race which endangers the peace and beginning to reduce accumulated stocks of weapons, to disarm.

The first practical results in this area have been achieved in recent years thanks to the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union. A series of important agreements in the field of arms limitation has been signed, including the Moscow treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, space, and under water, the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons, the treaty on nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the floors of seas and oceans, and others. The Soviet-American agreement concluded in 1973 to avert nuclear war was an important contribution to the cause of disarmament, as are the presently operative agreements between the USSR and the United States to limit strategic weapons, the treaty between the USSR and United States on underground nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes, and the agreement with France to avert accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. All these agreements have made it possible to lessen the threat of nuclear war and normalize the situation in the present-day world. The successes of Soviet peace policy are inseparably linked to the name of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev. His enormous services as an outstanding fighter for peace and detente have earned him a great and deserved reputation among the world's peoples.

Sessions of the U. N. General Assembly, the most important international forum, consistently see foreign policy initiatives by the

Soviet Union. Thus, in recent years at the suggestion of the Soviet Union the U. N. General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions to restrain the arms race and prohibit the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction. These proposals have been supported by a majority of U. N. members. Suffice it to recall that the 30th session (1975) passed the proposals of the Soviet Union and socialist countries entitled "Prohibition on the Development and Production of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons" and "Conclusion of a Treaty on Complete and Universal Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Testing" by a large majority of the votes.⁷

Endeavoring to reinforce progress already made in the struggle to stop the arms race, at the 31st session of the U. N. General Assembly in 1976 the Soviet Union presented a memorandum on issues of stopping the arms race and disarmament which reflected all the positive advances made by the socialist and other peace-loving countries in this area. The Soviet Union called on participants at the 31st session, in which 147 member states participated, to help stop the nuclear arms race, to reduce and later completely eliminate nuclear weapons, to bolster the system for nonproliferation of them, and to speed up development of a draft convention banning new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet memorandum also emphasizes the persistent need to ban and destroy chemical weapons and reduce the size of armed forces and stockpiles of conventional weapons. It also supports the aspiration of a large number of countries to turn the Indian Ocean and other regions into peace zones and the idea of calling a World Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union again expressed its readiness to enter talks on reducing the military budgets of the countries which are permanent Security Council members. The propositions of the Soviet memorandum became constituent parts of many decisions by the General Assembly on disarmament issues.

The session discussed the USSR proposal to conclude a treaty on complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons testing; this proposal was submitted at the 30th session of the General Assembly, but not realized owing to the position of the Western powers who played on the issue of controls. The Soviet proposal to begin talks concerning conclusion of a treaty on the universal and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons testing was supported by 95 countries (the United States, England, and France abstained and China voted against it). The General Assembly approved the draft World Treaty on Non-Use of Force in International Relations submitted by the USSR and put it on the agenda for the 32nd session.

The constructive contribution made by representatives of the Soviet Union to the work of the Committee on Disarmament working in Geneva is well known. The Soviet proposal on conclusion of an international agreement to ban the development and production of new types of weapons

of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is being actively discussed at this Committee.

The signing of the Concluding Act of the Meeting on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which promoted a significant normalization of the political atmosphere on the European continent, was a major success for the forces of socialism and peace led by the USSR. Acting in the spirit of the concluding act, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are striving to follow up political detente in Europe with military detente. Negotiations on this problem have been underway for several years already in Vienna.

"The Soviet Union," L. I. Brezhnev remarked at the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "continues to view success in the talks in Vienna with respect to reducing armed forces and arms in Central Europe as one of its crucial tasks. We are proposing concrete steps there which would lead to a reduction in the military forces confronting one another in Europe without causing harm to either side."⁸

It was the desire to make progress in the Vienna negotiations that guided the delegations of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia when, on 19 February 1976, they submitted a proposal which (considering the wishes of the Western countries) envisioned a two-stage solution to this problem. Implementation of this proposal would make it possible to finally attain an equal-percentage mutual reduction of ground forces, air forces, and armaments by the countries which have troops in Central Europe. However, the stubborn desire of the Western powers to gain unilateral military advantages for themselves is blocking the progress of these talks whose success is so important to all the peoples of Europe.

The Soviet Union wages its struggle for disarmament in close cooperation with the other countries of the socialist community, which consider it essential to promote steps to limit and stop the arms race. The emphasis in the coordinated actions of the socialist countries has now shifted to improving the effectiveness of the joint foreign policy actions which they take individually or together within the framework of the supreme coordinating agency of the Warsaw Pact, the Political Consulting Committee (PCC).

The consistent, coordinated policy of the Warsaw Pact countries was, in fact, the decisive factor which insured the success of the all-European meeting. The documents of all the meetings of the Political Consulting Committee held thus far reflect the firm intention of the socialist countries to build a strong system of all-European collective security, expand and deepen detente, make this process irreversible, and supplement it with steps toward military detente, including universal and complete disarmament in the future. This is reaffirmed by the results of the most recent meeting of the PCC (November 1976). Its members unanimously passed the declaration "Toward New Frontiers in International Detente, Toward Strengthening Security and Developing

Cooperation in Europe," which is a constructive platform of the socialist countries that will help turn Europe into a continent of peace and mutually advantageous cooperation. This document proposes that all countries which signed the concluding act of the all-European meeting adopt a treaty renouncing first use of nuclear weapons against one another. The participants at the PCC meeting confirmed their readiness to disband the Warsaw Pact Organization simultaneously with the disbanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and proposed that their military organizations be eliminated as a first step. They expressed their determination to continue and expand close cooperation on questions of limiting arms and disarmament both in Europe and throughout the world.⁹ "In the struggle for a strong peace today nothing is more important than stopping the arms race which the imperialist powers have instigated and moving toward disarmament," L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.¹⁰

Nonetheless, using old, wornout myths of what is called the "Soviet threat" and arguing that detente is a "one-way street" which supposedly serves the interests of the Soviet Union only, the West is essentially trying to undertake a new round in the arms race. According to figures from the U. N. General Assembly, roughly 300 billion dollars a year is spent in the world for armaments.¹¹ In the last two years alone the U. S. military budget has risen from 73.7 to 113 billion dollars. Now the American press, which often speaks on behalf of the military-industrial complex, is attempting to show that the military budget of the United States would have to be increased to 149.7 billion dollars in 1981.¹² Military expenditures in the FRG have risen 80 percent since 1971 and such expenditures are also increasing in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other capitalist countries.

The advocates of a policy of confrontation, closely tied to the military-industrial complexes, are trying to revitalize anti-Soviet, anti-communist myths, undermine faith in detente, and obstruct solutions to pressing international problems.

For the Soviet Union weapons mean a certain reduction in material, financial, and human resources which would otherwise be put to work building socialism and improving the standard of living of the working people. The need for arms does not arise from the economic or political demands of the development of socialism, but rather from the tasks of defending socialism against the threats of imperialism.

However, while the danger of global thermonuclear war remains, while the Western countries continue to build up their death-dealing fire power, the Armed Forces of our country must always be in combat readiness, able to stand together with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries and defend the peaceful labor of the peoples of the socialist community.

In his speech at Pula L. I. Brezhnev said, "The defensive potential of the Soviet Union should be sufficient so that no one would dare interrupt our peaceful life."¹³

At the same time, the Soviet Union is ready at any moment to take steps toward disarmament on a truly just, mutual basis and to carry on talks with other countries at any level. In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress it was pointed out that in foreign policy "the Soviet Union intends to search patiently and consistently for all possible new ways of developing peaceful, mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social systems and new paths toward disarmament."¹⁴

For the Soviet Union disarmament is not a tactical trick and not a temporary slogan. It is a basic part of the foreign policy of the world's first socialist state, which stands in the vanguard of the struggle for peace, detente, and disarmament.

In a situation where detente has become the leading trend in international development and the principles of coexistence are increasingly becoming the norm in mutual relations among states with different social systems, there are good prospects for furthering and deepening detente and stopping the arms race. The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" emphasizes that "while decisively rebuffing all the tricks of the enemies of peace and socialism, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries are striving to continue development of those changes in the international situation which favor peace and social progress, to make detente a continuous, increasingly vital, universal, and irreversible process engulfing all continents in the transition to stable, beneficial world cooperation among countries, to attaining practical results in disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament."¹⁵ This policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states is finding more and more active support among the nonaligned countries, broad layers of society in the capitalist countries, and all the progressive forces of our planet.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 22.
2. PRAVDA 19 January 1977.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 30, p 152.
4. "Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], Vol 5, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1961, p 193.

5. "Istoriya Vneshney Politiki SSR 1945-1975" [History of USSR Foreign Policy 1945-1975], Vol 3, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1976, p 391.
6. Ibid., p 304.
7. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' 1976, No 2, p 55.
8. PRAVDA 26 October 1976.
9. PRAVDA 27, 28 November 1976.
10. PRAVDA 26 October 1976.
11. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' 1976, No 2, p 57.
12. PRAVDA 26 December 1976.
13. PRAVDA 19 January 1977.
14. "Otchet TsK KPSS i Ocherednyye Zadachi Partii v Oblasti Vnutrenney i Vneshney Politiki" [The Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in Domestic and Foreign Policy] Moscow Politizdat, 1976, p 30.
15. "O 60-y Godovshchine Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy Sotsialisticheskoy Revolyutsii" [The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, pp 20-21.

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WARTIME SUCCESSES IN RADIOELECTRONIC ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

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[Article by Maj Gen-Engr A. Paliy, candidate of military sciences: "Radio-electronic Activities During the War"]

[Excerpts] During the Great Patriotic War there was an intensive radio-electronic struggle between Soviet and German fascist forces. The main efforts in the struggle were concentrated, on the one hand, on identifying enemy radio communications and radar equipment by radio reconnaissance and jamming them and destroying enemy control points, communications centers, radar stations, and radio stations, while on the other hand it involved concealing one's own radioelectronic means from enemy reconnaissance and protecting them against jamming.

The German fascist command carried on extensive radio reconnaissance. In the ground forces it was conducted by detached stationary radio reconnaissance points, radio reconnaissance companies of field armies, and radio reconnaissance platoons in infantry divisions.¹ Using short-wave and ultrashort-wave Telefunken reconnaissance receivers and radio direction finders the radio reconnaissance companies intercepted radio communications and located radio stations in a zone of up to 150 kilometers. The platoons, which consisted of two radio broadcast squads, a telephone listening squad, and a reconnaissance data processing point squad carried on radio reconnaissance in the tactical depth. Discovery of the actions of artillery, tanks, control points, and communications centers and radio equipment was given special attention in radio reconnaissance.

As Colonel General Jodl, chief of operational staff at the headquarters of the Supreme German High Command stated, "Radio reconnaissance, both open interception and decoding, played a special part at the very beginning of the war, but it continued to be important until the last. It is true that we were never able to intercept and decode radio messages from Supreme Headquarters or front and army headquarters. Like all other types of reconnaissance, radio reconnaissance was limited to the tactical zone."²

In its work fascist radio reconnaissance took advantage of the slightest violation of radio discipline or the rules of concealed troop control as well as unskillful use of radio equipment by radiomen. Evidence of this is given, specifically, in the statement by fascist General Rendulich, who said, "In the Russian Army, primarily in artillery and tank units, but also in combat engineer brigades, orders were commonly given by radio. The Russian code was soon broken. Because I was in the central and northern axes of the Eastern Front I was a witness to the fact that certain mortar brigades were excellent sources of information. The Russian radio operators often exchanged unofficial messages and also broadcast situation information which was often very important."³

In addition to carrying on radio reconnaissance the Germans tried to pass on false radiotelegrams to our radio operators, to enter communications with them, and to learn the location and affiliation of radio stations by query. The German disinformation specialists rearranged particular number groups in intercepted and recorded radiotelegrams, put several radiotelegrams together into one and, passing them on, tried to distract our radio operators from broadcasting and receiving combat orders.

To counter enemy radio reconnaissance the Soviet command worked out manuals and regulations on communications organization which recommended observance of secrecy measures and limited the use of radio equipment, especially before the beginning of operations. Correct use of radio communications and strict observance of rules of radio traffic made it significantly more difficult for enemy radio reconnaissance to get information about our troops. At the same time, some commanders occasionally took extreme measures without reasonable grounds and completely prohibited the use of radio communications. In a number of cases the so-called "radiophobia" was observed, where the possibility of interception of radiotelegrams, detection of radio stations by radio direction finder, and their destruction by enemy artillery or aviation was exaggerated. Certain commanders placed their radio stations far from control points, which made it difficult to use radio communications.

In reality, the capabilities of the radio direction finders used by the enemy at that time did not permit highly accurate identification and determination of radio stations in the short and medium wave bands, which were the types most commonly used. Therefore, radio stations and control points could not be hit accurately using radio reconnaissance data.

Soviet forces themselves carried on radio reconnaissance to disrupt enemy control. They began to use radio disinformation, to jam important radio broadcasts, and to wipe out control points and communications centers using artillery and aviation.

Radio reconnaissance on the fronts uncovered radio communications equipment and systems and collected information on the regions of headquarters deployment, lines reached by enemy troops, assembly areas for

main forces, and arrival of new units. Special attention was devoted to intercepting radio messages of tank and aviation units where the radio was the primary means of communication.

The jamming created during combat actions disrupted radio communication by the control points of army groups, field and tank armies, army, tank, and motorized corps and divisions and radio communications related to their cooperation with aviation. For example, the control points of army groups and field armies had 12-16 radio stations, army corps had 6-8, infantry divisions had 7-10, and infantry and tank regiments had 5-8. It should be observed that the radio stations of German divisions and regiments worked in the telephone and telegraph modes, while those of corps, armies, and army groups also had printing telegraphy.

There is no question that jamming disrupted enemy troop control. At first the radio sets of communications units were used for jamming, but in late 1942 special jamming units were formed: 130th, 131st, 132nd, and 226th detached special-purpose radio battalions (ordn spetsnaz). The spetsnaz units were directed by Lt Col-Engr M. I. Rogatkin (who today is a retired major general).

Each such unit had 8-10 RAF-KV vehicle-based radio stations specially equipped for jamming, 18-20 Virazh and Chayka reconnaissance radio receivers, and 4 55-PK-3A and Shtopor radio direction finders. In addition, the 130th, 131st, and 132nd spetsnaz units had one powerful Pchela railroad jamming station apiece. The battalions also used captured radio sets.

Jamming stations were usually deployed at 20-30 kilometers from the forward edge and 3-5 kilometers from battalion radio receiving centers. The spetsnaz radio battalions would detect enemy radio communications and jam them in close cooperation with radio reconnaissance units. The main enemy radio communications were watched around the clock; during this the chief and standby frequencies of the radio sets, their locations, military affiliations, and working regimes were identified.

The jamming was done by emitting continuous oscillations on the carrying frequency and by chaotic transmissions (manual or with a transmitter) of digital, alphabetic, or mixed text depending on the intensity and regime of radio traffic. To more effectively disrupt communications two jamming transmitters were assigned to each of the enemy's most important radio nets; one jammed the primary frequency and the other the standby frequency, thus insuring continuous disruption of the operation of radio communications. Enemy radio broadcasts were simulated to disguise the fact that jamming was being done. German radio operators thought these broadcasts were radiotelegrams from their own distant stations. Using captured radio sets for disinformation broadcasts achieved the greatest plausibility.

Before jamming the spetsnaz radio battalions would carefully scout enemy radio systems and equipment; this was done together with radio reconnaissance units.

Attempting to maintain communications when we were jamming, German radio operators often changed the working frequencies of their sets, broadcast radiotelegrams simultaneously on two frequencies or in separate groups, send out false messages to switch to other wave lengths during breaks in jamming but then continued to work the earlier frequencies, announced that telegrams had been received but then soon asked for them to be repeated, and went off the air, but then began again in 3-5 minutes. Sometimes they would cut the power of their transmissions to a minimum so that radio reconnaissance could not detect them or they would increase power to insure reliable transmission of radiotelegrams in the face of jamming. In addition to organizational-tactical radio camouflage measures and steps to protect radio communications against jamming, the headquarters of German divisions encoded radiotelegrams using Enigma coding machines, while infantry and tank units encoded messages manually. Furthermore, the headquarters of divisions and special units used radio traffic tables and code cards, changed radio operating data, especially when units were regrouped, and instituted complete or partial radio silence in certain sectors of the front before the beginning of an offensive.

Thus, the ground forces of the belligerent sides, like other branches of the armed forces, waged a vigorous, unflagging radioelectronic struggle.

In the Wisla-Oder operation of January-February 1945 the radioelectronic struggle was carried on in close cooperation by two spetsnaz radio battalions, the 130th of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 132nd of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The actions of the 132nd to neutralize the radio communications of enemy forces surrounded in Glogau and especially Breslau (Wroclaw) were particularly instructive.

After deploying near the village of Vangeu and then six kilometers west of Breslau, the battalion effectively jammed radio communications between the headquarters of forces surrounded in the city and the headquarters of the 4th Tank Army (in the city of Baucen), the 17th Army, the 8th Aviation Corps, the close aerial reconnaissance group, and the headquarters of forces surrounded in Breslau and Glogau. As a result of the effect of jamming German radio operators made 30-50 attempts each to establish communications and still were unable to transmit important radiotelegrams for extended periods of time. In all, jamming made it possible to prevent the transmission of roughly 700 radiotelegrams and more than 2,800 attempts to enter communications in Breslau and to stop 360 transmissions in Glogau. Intensive jamming made it impossible for any of 26 operational radiotelegrams to be transmitted by radio from Glogau to Baucen.

While observing enemy radio communications the battalion directed its attention to the slight radio traffic between the surrounded group in

Breslau and forces operating outside of encirclement. It was learned from intercepted radio traffic that the German forces were using underground cables for communication. After searching 45 underground cables running out of Breslau were found and knocked out. After this radio traffic became more intensive, which enabled jamming to disrupt radio communications between the surrounded grouping and forces operating outside of encirclement.

Special attention was given to disrupting radio communications of military transport aircraft delivering cargo to the surrounded forces. As a result, the crews of the German aircraft frequently lost their orientations and were unable to find the cargo drop regions.

Lieutenant Colonel Wittenberg, communications chief of the Breslau city garrison who was captured by Soviet forces, testified: "The Russians constantly thwarted our radio communications. Because of jamming we were forced to switch to different wave lengths, but then they would detect us and jam us again. Jamming delayed the transmission of radiotelegrams three hours and more, and therefore some of them had to be cancelled."⁸

By disrupting the radio communications of the units and formations of the Army Group Center the 130th and 132nd spetsnaz radio battalions made enemy troop control and cooperation among groupings surrounded in Breslau, Glogau, and Poznan much more difficult. This helped wipe them out quickly.

Very successful radio jamming disrupted communications by German units and formations in the East Prussian operation of January-April 1945, in which the 131st and 226th spetsnaz radio battalions took active parts.

They performed their missions very successfully: virtually all radio communications by enemy groupings, which had 175 radio sets in 30 radio nets and 300 radio frequencies, were jammed. In all, the reception of roughly 1,200 messages was prevented in the Koenigsberg grouping and 1,000 radiotelegrams in the Zemland grouping.

The following example may serve as an index of the effectiveness of jamming. During the assault on the Koenigsberg fortress by Soviet forces the main radio station of the surrounded garrison spent 24 hours trying to broadcast on 43 frequencies, but every one was jammed. After this on 9 April it transmitted the garrison commander's order on surrender of his forces in open text. The captured commander of the group of forces which defended Koenigsberg, Colonel General Liasch, testified at interrogation: "After the terrifying artillery preparation wire communication in the fort was knocked out. I hoped for radio communication with Courland, the Zemland grouping, and with Central Germany. But the effective actions of Russian jamming made it impossible to use radio equipment to transmit

radiotelegrams and the headquarters of the supreme high command could not coordinate my actions. This was one of the reasons for my surrender."⁹

Thus, jamming made it difficult to control the forces of the surrounded groupings and coordinate their actions with the actions of forces and aviation outside of encirclement and in large part promoted the success of Soviet forces in the East Prussian operation.

In the Berlin Operation the radioelectronic struggle reached its highest point. This included radio reconnaissance, jamming, disinformation, and destruction of radio equipment at enemy control points. This work was done by the 130th and 132nd spetsnaz radio battalions, members of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts respectively, who disrupted radio communications among the units, formations, and headquarters of German fascist forces. In addition, aircraft of bomber aviation jammed the radar of German air defense. Aviation and artillery delivered strikes against enemy control points, radar, and other radioelectronic means.

The high effectiveness of radio jamming in this operation resulted from correct definition of objectives, massing jamming on the most important communications, and timely maneuvering.

Aviation and long-range units making attacks on enemy installations and forces created passive radar interference against enemy air defense during their operations.¹² To achieve this three planes in each aviation regiment were loaded with metal foil ribbon which they dropped over the line of the front and in target regions, disrupting the work of enemy air defense radar. This made it easier for bomber aviation to perform its combat missions. Units of the air armies delivered strikes against enemy control points, communications centers, and radar posts found by radio direction finders.

Jamming and air and artillery strikes against enemy control points very effectively disrupted control and cooperation of ground forces, air forces, and air defense forces and means, which was unquestionably a great help to Soviet forces in smashing the Berlin grouping.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War radioelectronic struggles developed and became more sophisticated. Despite their small numbers, radio jamming and reconnaissance units and subunits gained considerable experience in detecting and neutralizing enemy radio and radar equipment. Their tactics, techniques of effectively jamming radio communications and radar work, methods of organizing and carrying out radio disinformation, and other procedures were improved from operation to operation.

In the offensive operations of the Soviet Army during the war years radioelectronic struggle was waged successfully by, on the one hand,

actively jamming radio communications, creating passive interference against enemy radar, taking radio camouflage steps, and carrying on disinformation and, on the other hand, by concealing friendly radio and radar equipment from enemy reconnaissance and neutralization.

Simultaneously with waging the radio electronic struggle, aviation and artillery delivered strikes against enemy control points, communications centers, radar posts, and radar-controlled search lights using direction finding data. The radioelectronic struggle was waged very intensively when there was close cooperation between the special ground jamming units and aircraft which created passive interference. The best results were achieved in disrupting the radio communications of control points during the encirclement and mopping up of large enemy groupings. Radio disinformation carried on by our forces in combination with other activities confused the enemy and thus helped achieve surprise.

An analysis of the combat actions of radio jamming and reconnaissance units and subunits has demonstrated that they were usually used in the main axes in the assault groups of the fronts. Their missions to organize and carry on the radioelectronic struggle were given by the chiefs of staffs of fronts based on the existing situation and operational missions. They were not used by the operational command.

The tactical procedures and methods of their combat work were continuously refined: speed in searching and recognizing, correct evaluation and determination of the affiliation of radio traffic, and selection of jamming targets, especially when command and observation posts and radio operating data changed.

During the war the mobility and operational capabilities for combat work of the radio jamming and reconnaissance units and subunits increased significantly.

The experience gained in organizing and carrying on radioelectronic struggle during the last war has not lost its timeliness. It is our opinion that it can be used to improve the forms and methods of this struggle under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Rendulich, Lothar, "Upravleniye Voyskami" [Troop Control],
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8. Ts AMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], fund 132
ordn, inventory 328334, file 1, sheet 30,
9. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL 1975, No 3, p 85.
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Gagarin, 1969, p 168.

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WARTIME SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS IN ARCTIC DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 77 signed to press 18 Apr 77 pp 20-28

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Noga, candidate of naval sciences: "Operations by the Northern Fleet To Defend Arctic Sea Lanes"]

[Excerpts] During the Great Patriotic War defense of our Arctic Sea lanes was one of the key missions of the Northern Fleet. At certain periods the fleet assigned its main forces to this mission.

The Arctic Sea routes were important to the northern regions of our country which had neither railroads nor highways. Industrial and natural products and many types of valuable raw material moved down the broad, deep rivers of Siberia to the Arctic Ocean. A stream of various kinds of cargo: coal, ore, timber, fur and the like was sent from its ports to the White Sea. Populated points, polar stations, and remote islands were supplied by the sea lanes and maneuvers of forces between the Pacific Ocean and Northern fleets were made there.

The distances from Arkhangel'sk were enormous: 650 miles to Yugorskiy Shar Strait, 1,170 miles to Dikson Island, and 1,600 miles to Vil'kitskiy Strait. Most of the route was iced in for 7-8 months of the year. Frequent storms, strong currents (up to four knots), lack of thorough exploration of the region, and inadequate technical equipping of the theatre, as well as mines laid by the enemy, created great hardships for navigation during the short Arctic season.

The German fascist command used various naval forces to disrupt our shipping, but submarines presented the greatest threat.

In August 1941 the White Sea Flotilla was formed as part of the Northern Fleet. Its primary mission was to support sea communication in the Arctic.¹ Rear Adm M. M. Dolinin was appointed commander,

1. TsVMA, [Central Naval Archive], fund 761, inventory 2, file 83, sheet 65.

brigade commissar V. Ye. Anan'ich was member of the military council, and Capt 1st Rank M. N. Popov was chief of staff (on 23 December 1941 he was replaced by Capt 1st Rank F. V. Zozulya). The flotilla included a division of destroyers and escort (patrol) craft, a division of minelayers, a minesweeping brigade, the White Sea shore defense sector, and other units. In 1942 the flotilla had up to 40 escort craft and minesweepers and roughly 100 various other boats as well as an air group consisting of reconnaissance aviation and antisub defense planes.

Convoying was the chief means of protecting shipping. The convoy crossings were done primarily on an everyday combat basis. Only in those cases where large numbers of transports or icebreakers had to be conducted across quickly were operations carried out. The need for them arose in October 1941 when a 14 October directive of the Main Naval Headquarters to the Northern Fleet ordered that 35 transports, five icebreakers, and several small vessels be brought from the Arctic to the White Sea. The White Sea Flotilla was enlisted for the operation (19 October - 27 December) and allocated two destroyers, five escort craft, and 10 minesweepers to escort the convoys. Screening ships in the crossing region, rescue ships, and all shore and air forces in the zone of the White Sea Flotilla were brought to readiness. During the operation Vice Adm A. G. Golovko, commander of the Northern Fleet, reinforced the flotilla (which was commanded by Vice Adm G. A. Stepanov from 3 October) with destroyers and other ships and means.

In view of the small amount of time available to bring the ships over because of the fast-deteriorating ice situation and aggressive enemy actions on the approaches to the Gorlo (Throat) of the White Sea, their crossing was planned by stages: Kara Sea -- Yugorskiy Shar Strait, Yugorskiy Shar Strait -- Bugrino, and Bugrino -- Arkhangel'sk. The transports traveled to Yugorskiy Shar on their own or guarded by escort craft. But from the strait to the Bugrino roadstead (the island of Kolguyev) they were conducted in groups of 3-4 ships escorted by 1-2 minesweepers. The Bugrino roadstead, an isolated body of water not watched by enemy aerial reconnaissance, became the formation point for convoys which were making the crossing through the most dangerous regions to the White Sea. Convoy crossings were organized so that by the time of arrival of the next group of 3-4 transports in Bugrino the escort craft would also be there. The convoy would form and then travel to Arkhangel'sk.

The convoy crossings were supported by aerial reconnaissance, submarine and mine searches, and minesweeping in the main channels. During the operation ships carried out 21 search missions, each lasting 2-4 days. Aviation of the White Sea Flotilla and Arkhangel'sk Military District carried out 84 reconnaissance and sub hunt missions. Fighter planes flew 22 missions as air cover for convoys in the Gorlo of the White Sea.² Screening ships, rescue ships, and forces of the White Sea Flotilla were in heightened readiness.

² TsVMA, fund 767, inventory 2, file 83, sheet 105.

The enemy was active during this period. Enemy submarines were spotted 36 times during the operation.³

In addition to enemy subs, aviation operated on our convoy routes, carrying on systematic reconnaissance and bombing ports and ships. On 2 November, for example, 10 Ju-88 planes dropped 34 bombs on Iokan'ga, damaging escort craft No 76 standing in the roadstead. On 13 November fascist aircraft attacked escort craft Nos 78 and 28 which were on patrol.

Despite enemy counteraction the operation, in which forces were controlled by the commander of the White Sea Flotilla through his staff, was carried out successfully, without losing any ships.

In all, in 1941 the Northern Fleet and White Sea Flotilla secured the navigation of 639 vessels on domestic sea lanes. They carried 180,000 people and 212,000 tons of war materials and economic goods. Just three ships were lost.

With experience gained defending shipping in 1941, the Northern Fleet carried out a larger operation the next year, bringing about 40 ships in from the Arctic and supporting a crossing from Dikson to Polyarnyy by ships of the Pacific Ocean Fleet (the leader Baku and destroyers Razumnyy and Raz'yarennyy). A Special-Purpose Expedition (EON-18) was formed for this. By this time the situation in the Northern Naval Theater was much more complex. Nazi submarines had penetrated to the Kara Sea and in August the German command sent the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer to the Arctic specially to intercept our convoys. The enemy laid minefields in key regions.

Vice Adm A. G. Golovko, commander of the Northern Fleet, was in charge of the operation, which lasted from 19 September to 5 December 1942.


In 1943 there was further development of operations to defend naval shipping. The largest operations were bringing icebreakers to the Arctic and returning them to the White Sea in the autumn.

In 1944 the Northern Fleet conducted 407 convoys along domestic sea lanes in the White, Barents, and Kara seas. The convoys had a total of 707 transports carrying 349,100 passengers and 386,000 tons of cargo.¹⁰

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War the Northern Fleet accumulated considerable experience in operations to defend Arctic sea lanes. the fleet headquarters carefully analyzed all possible variations for optimal performance of assigned missions, probable enemy counteraction, and physical geographic conditions of the crossing region and prepared a decision for the operation. After the commander adopted a decision the

³ TsVMA, fund 982, inventory 1, file 8, sheet 52.

¹⁰ "Istoriya Voenno-Morskogo Iskusstva" [History of the Art of Naval Warfare], Voenizdat, 1969, p 439.



Actions of the Northern Fleet to Defend Arctic Sea Lanes

- Key: (1) Arctic Sea Lanes; (2) Actions by Fascist Submarines; (3) Deployment of Northern Fleet Submarines; (4) Aerial Reconnaissance of Northern Fleet Aviation; (5) Search for Enemy Submarines by Northern Fleet Ships and Aviation; (6) Minesweeping; (7) Admiral Scheer, August 1942.

staff would work out a plan for the operation, a table of cooperation, and other documents. In the battle directive the fleet commander would give the White Sea Flotilla and other units missions for the operation. In addition to the battle order there would be a planning table for use of forces, battle instructions, communications documents, and the like.

Simultaneously with planning forces were prepared and regrouped. These actions amounted to the following.

Before the beginning of the operation enemy air reconnaissance would intensify. Submarines occupied positions along the coast of Norway to cover the convoy against possible strikes by large surface vessels. Naval aviation stepped up its strikes against ships and airfields. Surface ships (destroyers and torpedo boats) and groups of assault aviation planes, which made up operational screening forces, were put in readiness for immediate departure or takeoff. The defense in the convoy crossing regions was reinforced. Reconnaissance became more active, extra patrols were set out, aviation searched for submarines, and sometimes also surface ships, check sweeps of channels and recommended courses along the convoy crossing route were made, and floating mines were detected and disarmed.

Because submarines presented the greatest threat to convoys the chief formation in a crossing was the antisub formation. The increased number of ships by 1944 made it possible to create a circular escort in one line, sometimes two. Airplanes began to be used for direct anti-sub defense of convoys in 1943 and special ship search and assault groups were formed to pursue and destroy submarines.

In regions of danger from enemy aviation convoys were covered by fighter planes which patrolled in groups of 6-8 aircraft over the convoy or stood on duty at an airfield.

Much attention was given to camouflage. Convoy formation points not visible from the air were chosen for this purpose. The forces assigned to an operation were deployed secretly. Convoy crossing routes were varied and ships passed through dangerous regions in darkness. Radio silence was strictly observed.

The fleet commander usually exercised general direction of an operation. Direct command of the forces at sea was assigned to the flotilla commander.

Usually a convoy cruise headquarters was formed and it worked out the necessary documents for the crossing, checked the readiness of the transports and their combat organization, and insured battle control.

To insure cooperation all documents were worked out carefully and studied by the performers, ship commanders and transport captains were given preliminary instructions, and group exercises were held.

Special convoy operations to defend Arctic Sea lanes produced good results. Careful planning and preparation of forces, numerous support measures, reinforcing the immediate guard for the transports, and organizing precise cooperation among forces made it possible to bring convoys through without significant losses even in the face of strong enemy counteraction, as was the case in 1943-44.

During the war the scale of forces involved in operations and their organization and cooperation improved. It was in operations that new convoy procedures were most often used (convoys by stage or parts with reinforced escort in the most dangerous sectors).

Aggressive actions by various naval forces on sealandes and strikes by naval aviation against ships in bases and planes at airfields had a large effect on the successful outcome of operations.

During the period of preparation for and conducting operations purposeful party political work was carried on. The command, political agencies, and party organizations mobilized personnel for successful fulfillment of the important missions of conducting convoys.

The experience of the Northern Fleet in preparing for and carrying out operations to defend Arctic Sea lanes during the Great Patriotic War continues to be significant today.

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MILITARY-PATRIOTIC WORK IN KIRGIZIYA DESCRIBED

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[Article by D. Tursunov, editor of SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN, chairman of the Kirgiz SSR Union of Journalists: "Military-Patriotic Work in Kirgiziya"]

[Excerpts] More than 120 monuments to warriors who gave their lives in the battles for our native land have now been erected in our towns. In the republic there are 90 Lenin museums, 70 Lenin halls, roughly 1,000 Lenin rooms and corners, and more than 400 museums and rooms showing the combat glory of the Soviet people.

The Kirgiz SSR has 46 future fighting man universities and lecture bureaus. Forms of military-patriotic work such as draftee days, paramilitary games, and spartakiads (multievent competitions) based on the Ready for the Defense of the Homeland set have done well. About 200 detachments of friends of pilots, reconnaissance men, sailors, and so on have been established.

Topical evening meetings with ceremonial presentation of battle colors have become very popular in the republic. At the request of the board of directors of the republic division of the Znaniye Society the Central Museum of the Soviet Armed Forces has sent the banners of the regiments of the 385th Rifle Division, which was formed in the republic during the Great Patriotic War, to Kirgizia five times. Veterans of this famous unit have taken part in almost 200 evening meetings.

The USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation envisions elementary military training in the regular schools and at enterprises. The training points of the Frunze Instrument Making Plant imeni 50-Letiya Kirgizskoy SSR and the Pamir Vehicle Transport Trust in the city of Osh provide examples of well-organized preparation of young men for service in the army. They hold regular meetings for the young people with employees of DOSAAF and the military commissariats, party and Komsomol activists, and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. The young men help collect information and materials related to their heroic countrymen, visit military subunits, and familiarize themselves with the life and training of the personnel in them.

There are, however, weak spots in military-patriotic work in Kirgiziya alongside the successes.

For example, training periods in elementary military training at the training points of the Przheval'sk Electrical Engineering Plant, the Osh Vehicle Repair Plant, the Frunze Kirgizavtomash Plant, and certain other enterprises are held in areas that have not been equipped for this purpose. The enterprise directors are not devoting the needed attention to creating the physical facilities necessary for effective elementary military training.

Propaganda for theoretical military knowledge is not done well among the republic's population. In some rayons and cities thematic film festivals, readers' conferences, and viewers' conferences on military-patriotic subjects are held sporadically. Work to prepare rated sportsmen and winners of the Ready for the Defense of the Homeland badge is not going well either. More attention must be given to physical education for young people. We must also increase the role of the family, schools, and labor collectives in military-patriotic education of young people. Special care should be taken to see that the subject of patriotism and heroism is reflected more widely in the curricula and syllabi of the schools. A serious weakness in military-patriotic education is the fact that the republic, oblast, and city organizations of the Znaniye Society do not have technical equipment and graphic materials for propaganda work. Many kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the republic are without posters, film strips, and albums about Heroes of the Soviet Union with brief descriptions of their exploits. The party schools and seminars still do not have sufficient methodological literature, annotated bibliographies, and topical plans for lectures, conferences, and evening meetings that could be used by lecturers and propagandists in their everyday activities.

To successfully propagate military knowledge on a high ideological and theoretical level all workers on the ideological front must have a good knowledge of our Leninist heritage, party decisions on military issues, and the basic tenets of Soviet military science and art of war and be able to tie the content of lectures and discussions into current challenges and goals of party work in this area.

Educating the working people of our republic in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, with an eye to the invincible friendship of the peoples of the USSR in this anniversary year, the year of the 60th jubilee of Great October, is the backbone of all ideological work by party, Soviet and public organizations in Kirgiziya. It must be improved and conducted in such a way that our young people become deeply aware of the importance of the succession of generations in Soviet society, so that our young people think more often about how, in what particular interpretation, they can best continue the work begun by their elders and bring the bright future of all humanity, communism, closer.

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CPSU ACTIVITIES IN STRENGTHENING ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

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[Article by F. Petrov: "CPSU Activities To Strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces in the Postwar Period"]

[Text] Speaking at the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said: "As for our defense, we will spend exactly as much for it as is necessary for the security of the Soviet Union, for defense of the gains of socialism jointly with the fraternal countries, to insure that potential aggressors are not tempted to try to use force to resolve the historical dispute between the two opposed social systems in their favor. To keep the Armed Forces of our country at a high level and see that Soviet fighting men have the most advanced weapons, weapons that the imperialists cannot disregard -- that is our duty to the people and we will hold it sacred!"¹

History gives convincing evidence that in all stages of the development of the Soviet State the Communist Party has devoted fixed attention to building up the country's defense capability and increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces. That is how it was in the first years of Soviet power, in the interwar period, during the Great Patriotic War, and that is how it is today. The party does everything necessary to provide the army and navy with first-class weapons and equipment.

Party military activities, as well as other problems, are thoroughly reviewed in the ten-volume edition of documents "KPSS v Rezoyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S'yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee] which has come out in recent years.² These books show how the CPSU developed the national economy in the postwar period and improved the Armed Forces. From the documents of the 19th Congress (1952), which are published in the sixth volume, one can see that the scientific and technical advances made under socialism have been aimed primarily at development of the entire national economy and increasing its growth rate. Because the threat of aggression by the imperialist powers exists, however, the USSR is also forced to use scientific-

technical progress in the interests of building up the country's defense capability and increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces.

Party decisions have been realized in concrete deeds. At the present time our army and navy have first-class weapons and equipment, including nuclear missiles. "As the result of qualitative and quantitative changes in armament and technical equipment the fire power, striking force, and mobility of the Ground Forces have increased sharply and the organizational structure of its units has changed," says the book "50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces]. "The combat capabilities and organizational structure of the National Air Defense Forces are changing radically. The combat capabilities of the Air Force are increasing sharply. The Navy is becoming qualitatively different. The growing strength of the socialist economy and its outstanding scientific and technical advances have enabled the Soviet Union to build various classes of missiles and produce the necessary number of them in just a few years."³

The work of the CPSU to bolster the material-technical base of the state as a necessary condition for maintaining the combat might of the army and navy at the required level is well displayed in the book "Boyevoy Put' Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [The Battle History of the Soviet Armed Forces], the ten-volume publication "Resheniya Partii i Pravitel'stva po Khozyaystvennym Voprosam" [Decisions of the Party and Government on Economic Questions], the three-volume "XXV S'yezd KPSS. Stenograficheskiy Otchet" [The 25th CPSU Congress. Stenographic Report], and the five-volume collection of L. I. Brezhnev's articles and speeches entitled "Leninskim Kursom" [Following a Leninist Course].⁴ These works give a profound, Marxist-Leninist review of the main factors in the defensive might of the Soviet State and the primary directions of the political and economic strategy of the party and government and reveal the intensive work of the CPSU to carry out Lenin's teachings on defense of the socialist fatherland.

The work "KPSS -- Organizator Zashchity Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [The CPSU -- Organizer of the Defense of Socialist Society]⁵ thoroughly analyzes party activities to improve the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. "In December 1959," the book notes, "the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government adopted a decision to establish a new branch of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces. This was a fundamentally new step in building the Armed Forces and insured further increase in the defensive might of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community.

"Since their beginning the missile forces have grown into a mighty force that is now the primary branch of the Armed Forces" (p 396).

Without any doubt the Strategic Missile Forces have become our country's reliable shield. Nonetheless, the Communist Party believes that victory in modern warfare can only be secured through the combined efforts of all branches of the Armed Forces. Working from this idea, the CPSU has

carried out the essential reorganization in recent years. The combat capabilities of the Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Force, and Navy have increased enormously. Their weaponry, combat equipment, and organizational structure, the above-mentioned work stresses, have been brought into line with the requirements of waging combat under modern conditions. For example, the current motorized rifle division has 16 times as many tanks as the 1939 division, 37 times more armored personnel carriers, 13 times more automatic weapons, and five times as much radio communications equipment, not to mention the improved quality of current equipment (p 397).

Questions of increasing the combat might of the army and navy are a constant focus of attention for our party. This is eloquently illustrated by the documents of the 25th CPSU Congress. In the Accountability Report, which was presented by L. I. Brezhnev, it points out: "For all these years the party devoted the necessary attention to building up our country's defensive capabilities and improving the Armed Forces. We can report to the Congress that we have done a good deal in this area. The Armed Forces have received new, modern equipment and weapons and the quality of personnel combat training and ideological conditioning has improved. In general, comrades, the Soviet people may be confident that the fruits of their constructive labor are reliably guarded.

"No one should doubt that our party will do everything necessary in the future to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have all essential means to perform their important mission -- to act as the guardian of the Soviet people's peaceful labor, to act as the bulwark of world peace."⁶

The Soviet people are struggling to realize the designs of the 25th CPSU Congress. New advances in economic development and equipping the army and navy with up-to-date weapons and equipment are being made consistently.

While giving fixed attention to material-technical supply to the Armed Forces, improving organizational structure, and insuring that they have the latest equipment and weapons, the Communist Party at the same time has devoted enormous concern to the ideological-political education of army and navy personnel. This crucial question is extensively treated in the books by A. A. Yepishev "Partiya -- Organizator Nashikh Pobed" [The Party -- Organizer of Our Victories] and "Nekotoryye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Some Issues of Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces] as well as in the collections of works such as "Politicheskkiye Zanyatiya. Soderzhaniye, Organizatsiya, Metodika" [Political Training Periods. Content, Organization, Methodology], "Ideologicheskaya Rabota KPSS v Vooruzhennykh Silakh v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh" [The Ideological Work of the CPSU in the Armed Forces Under Current Conditions], "Politorgany Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (1918-1970 gg.)" [The Political Agencies of the Soviet Armed Forces (1918-1970)], "Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR"

[Party-Political Work in the Armed Forces of the USSR], "KPSS o Formirovanii Novogo Cheloveka" [The CPSU on Shaping the New Human Being], and others.⁷

These works emphasize that the essence of all ideological work lies in teaching Soviet people the communist worldview, high political consciousness, and social activism. For the fighting men of the army and navy, this means above all a correct understanding of the historical purpose and missions of the Soviet Armed Forces, their place and role in the life of Soviet society and the defense of socialism, and an awareness of their own personal responsibility for the security of our native land and raising the combat capability and combat readiness of the army and navy.

The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, which took note of the enormous role of the Soviet Army in patriotic, international education of young men, play an important part in determining the main directions of ideological work at the present time. The Accountability Report stresses that Soviet young men return from the army as "men who have gone through a school of endurance and discipline and received technical and professional knowledge as well as political training."⁸

This party assessment obligates commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and all army ideological workers to a great deal. Their mission is to continue improving the system of personnel education.

The collection "KPSS o Formirovanii Novogo Cheloveka" contains the main challenges formulated by the party in the area of ideological education. The chief thing is to adopt a comprehensive approach to the education of Soviet people, combining political, moral, and labor education with due regard for the special characteristics of different groups of working people. Patriotic and international education are important in this.

In A. A. Yepishev's book "Partiya -- Organizator Nashikh Pobed" the section entitled "The Comprehensive Approach in Organizing Ideological Education" gives a thorough interpretation of this method. It is "rooted in Marxism's view of society as a system organized in a definite manner, all of whose elements are closely related, interdependent, and have a definite subordination" (p 95). The author further points out that the "entire organization of military service in the Soviet Armed Forces has an exceptionally large influence on the consciousness of the fighting men. Under these conditions the intricate problem of controlling the spiritual development of the personnel involves coordinating the action of such formative factors as the social environment, the system of training and education, self-development and self-education, and so on" (pp 96-97).

In the army and navy the comprehensive approach helps (1) encompass all spheres of military activity with the ideological influence; (2) assumes

broad and skillful use of all available means of ideological education; (3) makes it possible to involve all commanders, political workers, and engineering-technical personnel in active educational work (pp 98-99). The comprehensive approach in organizing all educational work insures development of all aspects and traits of the personality, the spiritual make-up, worldview, and moral code of a Soviet individual, which also means a defender of our country (p 100).

A. A. Yepishev's other book, "Nekotoryye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh," gives a thorough summary of ideological-political work among personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. In it the author reveals the characteristics of ideological work under current conditions and steps to make it more effective. Considerable attention is given to making use of the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces as an important means to education of Soviet fighting men (p 109) and to patriotic education.

The collection "Politicheskoye Zanyatiye. Soderzhaniye, Organizatsiya, Metodika" gives a thorough review of the forms and methods of conducting political training in the army. The authors show that, thanks to the tireless concern of our party's Central Committee, the content and organizational structure of political training in the army and navy are improving. Today this training takes fuller account of the increased interest fighting men show for Marxist-Leninist theory, timely problems of CPSU policy, and issues of bolstering the defensive capabilities of the USSR and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The authors note that, as experience demonstrates, the lecture-seminar method of political training has proven itself completely. In it primary attention is given to deep study of the materials and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and explanation of the challenges set by the party before the people and the armed defenders of our native land.

The authors show that the essence of effectiveness in political training periods is expressed in the degree to which personnel assimilate party policy and the missions given to the Armed Forces and the unit or ship, their implacable hostility to the alien bourgeois ideology, growth of sociopolitical activism, the concrete results of combat training and discipline, and mastering modern equipment and weapons.

The entire book gives a clearer picture of ways to attain highly effective political training. The crucial factors are a further rise in the ideological level of training periods and tying political education closely to combat training and the persistent struggle to fulfill socialist obligations and perform combat training missions well.

Effective ideological education is based on such key factors as the theoretical and military outlook and methodological skills of propagandists, management of them by commanders and political agencies, and help from party and Komsomol organizations. There can be no dispute with the authors' statement that creativity and initiative in conducting training periods and a determined, consistent struggle against formalism and stereotyped methods are essential.

Profound ideological conviction is the foundation of the high moral-political qualities of army and navy fighting men. These qualities are being brilliantly demonstrated today in the struggle to fulfill the plans outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress. That is why the party, seeking the comprehensive approach to shaping the new person, the approach that insures unity in political, moral, and labor education, is making ideological conditioning paramount today.

The Soviet fighting man acquires this conditioning during his service, training, and military labor, which personify lofty communist ideals.

In the postwar period the CPSU has taken great care to see that Soviet theoretical military thought develops continuously, is refined, and stays up to date. This is understandable. Under current conditions the missions of armed defense of the socialist homeland cannot be performed successfully without thorough scientific substantiation. The activity of the Communist Party toward further development of military theory is treated in many works, among them "KPSS -- Organizator Zashchity Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" and the first and second volumes of the "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia].¹⁰

On page 356 of the book "KPSS -- Organizator Zashchity Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" it says that "under conditions of swift development of military affairs the role of military science has risen sharply. In a developed socialist society where science increasingly acts as a direct productive force, military theory has a growing influence on the accomplishment of the missions of Soviet military building and raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The CPSU and its Central Committee are taking effective steps to steadily improve military science on the solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism with due regard for the economic, political, and moral factors and the tenets and conclusions of the social, natural, and technical sciences."

The Communist Party devotes a great deal of attention to seeing that new recruits to the Soviet Armed Forces are technically sophisticated and highly skilled. It is noted in the documents published in the ninth and tenth volumes of "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" that the party is constantly looking after the training of command, political, and technical cadres for the army and navy who are drawn from the best representatives of the Soviet people and are completely devoted to the cause of communism. The CPSU considers it essential that command personnel work consistently on Marxist-Leninist theory, have a high level of military-technical training, meet all requirements of contemporary military theory and practice, and be ready to give all their efforts, and life itself if need be, to defend our socialist homeland.

It is observed in the books under review that thanks to the solicitude of the CPSU our Armed Forces today have sophisticated, politically mature command personnel with good military and technical training who are dedicated to the party and the people. Each year highly qualified

new officers, graduates of our higher military schools and academies, arrive to serve in the army and navy.

The questions of building up the defensive might of the countries of the socialist community and uniting all peace-loving forces for the struggle against aggressive militaristic forces have occupied an important place in the books published in recent years.

The collection "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1975" [The Warsaw Pact Organization 1955-1975]¹¹ published more than 60 documents which record the process of the early development and buildup of the Warsaw Pact Organization. These documents show that the Warsaw Pact is a new type of organization in terms of its objectives and orientation. It is a political defensive alliance based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. For a quarter of a century now it has served as a reliable guarantee of the security of the fraternal socialist countries and the peaceful labor of their peoples and insured the inviolability of their borders and territory and precise coordination and unity of action in the international arena.

The content of the Friendship Pact, the decisions to set up a Unified Command, the decisions of meetings of the secretaries of the communist parties of the fraternal countries, and the communiques and statements of meetings of Warsaw Pact members show, as do the events of contemporary life, that the peace-loving policy of the states which have joined in the Warsaw Pact Organization has become a decisive factor in defending the interests of peoples' peace and independence.

A. Latso's book "Varshavskiy Dogovor -- Instrument Obespecheniya Mira" [The Warsaw Pact -- Tool for Securing the Peace], which was translated from German in 1974, shows the enormous struggle of the Warsaw Pact Organization members for international detente, a restructuring of international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, and peace in Europe.

The author rightly considers the steps taken by Warsaw Pact countries a response to the militaristic preparations of the imperialist states.

And indeed, in recent years certain circles in the United States, England, Japan, the FRG and the other imperialist states have been whipping up the arms race, stimulating the invention of new types of weapons, and steadily enlarging the military budgets of their countries.

Progressive public opinion is also alarmed by the militant statements ringing out in the FRG and Bonn's pressure on its allies, in particular France, to change their military strategy and become more involved in the "Atlantic system."

From the collections of documents, scientific investigations, and thematic monographs it can be seen that the CPSU is working tirelessly to insure continued elaboration of the Leninist theory of defense of the socialist state. A number of key challenges related to further buildup

of the defensive capabilities of the Soviet State have been formulated at recent Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and at the 25th Congress.

Needless to say, as long as imperialism exists there is a constant threat of aggressive wars against the socialist states. Therefore, the theoretical and practical issues of defending our native land are of paramount importance. This is because the NATO propaganda mechanism carries on endless activities to regenerate the cold war and continue the militarization of the NATO countries, constantly playing on the mythical "Soviet threat."

In conclusion I would like to say that Soviet readers, regardless of vocation and specialization, show a great interest in literature that uncovers the sources of the strength and might of our country. In our day of swift scientific and technical development the process of building up and developing the Soviet Armed Forces is closely and directly tied to questions of machinery and technology as well as issues of ideology, psychology, and other branches of science. Deeper and more systematic treatment in the literature of the influence and significance of these factors for the state of the country's defense and revealing their interdependence is interesting to readers and satisfies their wishes.

There is no doubt that the books surveyed in this article will help them attain a deeper grasp and understanding of the primary challenges and directions of party policy in the postwar years and perceive more completely the objectives which the CPSU sets when building up the defensive might of the Soviet State.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA 26 October 1976.
2. "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK," vol 1-10, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970-1972.
3. "50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," Voenizdat, 1968, p 503.
4. "Boyevoy Put' Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil," Voenizdat, 1960; "Resheniya Partii i Pravitel'stva po Khozyaystvennym Voprosam," vol 1-10, Moscow, Politizdat, 1967-1976; "XXV S"yezd KPSS. Stenograficheskiy Otchet," Moscow, Politizdat, 1976; Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim Kursom," vol 1-5, Moscow, Politizdat, 1973-1976.
5. "KPSS -- Organizator Zashchity Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva," Voenizdat, 1974.
6. "Materialy XXV S'yезда KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 83.

7. Yepishev, A. A., "Partiya -- Organizator Nashikh Pobed," Voenizdat, 1976; Yepishev, A. A., "Nekotoryye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh," Voenizdat, 1975, 128 pp; "Politicheskiye Zanyatiya. Soderzhaniye, Organizatsiya, Metodika," Voenizdat, 1975, 120 pp; "Ideologicheskaya Rabota KPSS v Vooruzhennykh Silakh v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh," Moscow, Izdatel'stvo VPA, 1972, 232 pp; "Politorgany Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (1918-1970)," Voenizdat, 1963, 1,254 pp; "Partiyno-Politicheskaya Rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR," Voenizdat, 1974; 366 pp; "KPSS o Formirovanii Novogo Cheloveka," Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, 456 pp.
8. "Materialy XXV S"yezda..." op. cit., pp 75-76.
10. "Sovetskaya Voenennaya Entsiklopediya," vol 1-2, Voenizdat, 1975-1976.
11. "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1975. Dokumenty i Materialy MID SSSR" [The Warsaw Pact Organization 1955-1975. Document and Materials of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, 190 pp.
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PROBLEMS OF MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION OF YOUTH DISCUSSED

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[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Ye. Andryushchenko, scientific secretary of the section for military-patriotic education, Council for Coordination of Scientific Research on Problems of Communist Youth Education: "The Status and Perspectives for Scientific Solution of the Problems of Military-Patriotic Education of Youth"]

[Text] The CC LYCLSU and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences USSR have set up a public council for coordination of the scientific research on the problems of communist education of youth. Membership in the council includes leading scientists and specialists of the Academy of Sciences USSR, the Academies of Pedagogical and Medical Sciences, the academies of sciences of the Union republics, scientific and educational institutions under CC CPSU, and higher educational institutions, representatives of party, soviet, trade-union and Komsomol organs, ministries and departments, craft unions, and organizations which participate in the solution of these problems and use the derived results in their practical work.

The function of the council is coordination and escalation of the level of scientific research and pooling of the efforts of the scientists in solution of the pressing problems of education of the younger generation. The council includes several sections on basic youth problems, including sections on military-patriotic education. Approved as chairman of the council was Colonel General G. V. Sredin and as his deputy corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Lt Gen P. A. Zhilin.

The section is made up of scientists who are working on problems of military-patriotic education and practical workers who are addressing themselves to problems of military-patriotic youth education and have a great deal of experience in this work. The section includes responsible representatives of all the state and public organizations which deal with training of young people for service in the Soviet Army and Navy. Many of them have considerable work experience in science.

In the time which has elapsed since its founding the section has embarked on active work for the compilation of consolidated card indexes, theme projects and a bibliography and collated problem studies on the urgent problems of military-patriotic education. It carried out an analysis and generalization of some of the methods employed in research, made recommendations for standard methods and prepared for publication an information bulletin which delineates the status of solution of these problems in the country. In December 1976, in collaboration with the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences USSR, it held an All-Union scientific and practical conference on "Communist Education of Young People in the Heroic Traditions of the Soviet People in the Period of the Great Patriotic War."

The research in the field of military-patriotic education was occasioned by the vital needs of the party, state and public organizations which are directly concerned with the conduct of ideological and educational work.

Recent years have witnessed a great deal of practical work on the education of young people in the revolutionary, labor and combat traditions of our people. In his CC CPSU review report to the 25th CPSU Congress L. I. Brezhnev declared: "In the period gone by the party organizations devoted a great deal of effort to patriotic education of the workers and, along with this, strengthening of the internationalist consciousness of the masses. An enormous role along these lines was played by the celebration of the 50th year of USSR education and the 30th year since the victory in the Great Patriotic War."¹ Appearing in the press was a considerable number of journalistic materials on the war and the army; publications included also a sizable amount of military-historical and military-memoir literature touching upon the military-patriotic education of young people. In addition, this theme was elaborated in numerous novels, films, plays, etc.² Recently published by the press have been studies (by L. A. Bublik, Yu. S. Vasyutin, Yu. I. Deryugin, P. I. Kapyrin, V. K. Konoplev, V. G. Kolychev, G. K. Mosolov, V. M. Tsuzik, B. M. Sapunov, N. M. Sushkov, G. M. Shashlo and others) dealing with the work of the party and the state and public organizations as well as the content, experience, organizational forms, methods, means, principles, basic concepts and directions of military-patriotic education. A total of 76 dissertations were defended in the past five-year period. But what has been accomplished is meagre, still lacks the required coordination and is inadequately motivated by a sense of purpose.

Exceptionally great importance attaches to study of the origin and development of the forms of military-patriotic education and the activity of the state and public organizations concerned with mass-defense, physical culture-health improvement, and military-patriotic work. The forms of military-patriotic youth education now in existence and the beginning military training in the schools and enterprises have changed and developed. This path has been marked by both achievements and difficulties. A profound knowledge of the history and characteristics of the work of the defense and sports societies of the country in the various periods will enrich our experience and help us to

conduct the military-patriotic education of young people in more meaningful and purposeful fashion and to distribute our efforts effectively.

When a study was made of the themes for the research planned in the scientific research organizations and higher educational institutions for the 1971-1980 period, it was found that only 112 (4 percent) of the 2,786 themes were concerned with the military-patriotic problem. This is evidence of the unsystematic and irrational distribution of the scientists' efforts. In 55 instances the subject of the contemplated research was school youth and in 20 instances student youth. Ten themes dealt with the role of the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions in youth education, seven with general problems of military-patriotic education, seven with training of GTO ["Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR"] badge personnel, and five with party management and military-patriotic education. Only a few themes shed light on the problems of working and rural youth and students in vocational schools (and after all, it is these groups of young people who comprise the largest proportion of the recruitment contingent).

The role of the press in military-patriotic education is receiving coverage but little attention is being given to radio, television, motion pictures, the political education system and the other media of ideological influence. There are no requests for research which would examine the effectiveness of the various forms of military-political education. There has been no evidence of the required attention to the preparation of a material base and personnel to handle the management of military-patriotic education. Little attention is being devoted to study of cooperation among the various state and public organizations doing military-patriotic work. Such mass public movements as the All-Union field trip to the places of the revolutionary, labor and combat glory of the Soviet people, etc. are still not undergoing careful analysis and generalization. Often various themes were developed not because they were needed by society but because they were suggested, and at times even imposed, by the researchers themselves. The reason for this was the lack of coordination in the scientific research work in the field of military-patriotic education. Until recently our country did not have a leading specialized scientific institution charged with research on this problem. For example, in accordance with a long-standing tradition the instruction and education of schoolchildren is carried out by the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences USSR, the academies of pedagogical sciences of the Union republics, etc. The subject matter of the research done by the military scientists was primarily the army itself and the processes of instruction and education of its personnel. No study was devoted to the problem of training of young people for service in the army (especially the part which operates at the enterprises, plants, factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes). Almost entirely neglected were the contingents of young people who had already returned from the army.

Problems in research of an applied nature are making themselves felt with particular keenness. The data derived from this research can and must be utilized as operational information in the party, state and public organs.

In the field of military-patriotic education, as everywhere else, there is need for information which will furnish a clear idea of the effectiveness and efficacy of a particular decision, measure or propaganda campaign.

In light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, it is now, as never before, important to conduct concrete and operational research which is closely tied in with the practical work of management of society, study of the actual forms and trends of social development, and prediction of the consequences of various measures. Broad development of this kind of research on the problem of military-patriotic education undoubtedly makes concrete and generalizes the theoretical and ideological work and makes its results more effective.

The work of coordination of the research of a military-patriotic character reveals for us the essential characteristics of the field under study and enables us to develop research methods.

Coordination in this field must, we believe, embrace the content of the problems under study and the methods needed for the conduct of this research.

In the first stage of the coordination work it is obviously necessary to compile information on the status of the practical research work and to analyze what has already been done. The second stage should involve apprising the scientists of the directions of the research work and eliminating duplication of themes. The third stage requires the stimulation of contact among the scientists and exchange of ideas, experience and achievements; also, organization of work in the most urgent fields of research. Finally, the fourth stage addresses unification and standardization of research methods and establishment of a unified system of indicators and an All-Union information system in the realm of military-patriotic education.

At the beginning of coordination it is necessary to select the chief directions, to focus the scientists' attention on them and to resolve the key problems. What are considered the chief directions in the work? What principle guides the setting up of work groups in the section and the assignment to them of researchers scattered throughout the country? The simplest approach, of course, is to group according to specialties the philosophers, teachers, historians, etc. As the basis for dividing the work groups we can take the various contingents of young people who are the subject of the research--school children, students, etc.

In our opinion, dividing the work groups according to the science subjects at a particular stage is undesirable because the aim of the coordination is not some science itself per se and not just the development of theoretical propositions but primarily the solution of concrete practical problems.

A large group of scientists is showing a keen interest in student and school youth. This is due to the nature of the everyday work of the researchers themselves--chiefly the teachers of the schools and VUZ's. The object of

their work is easily accessible to them and is quite familiar to them. Thus, for example, there is at MGU [Moscow State University] imeni M. V. Lomonosov an initiative group which is ready to undertake coordination of the research work on military-patriotic education among the student population. There are potent arguments in favor of such a decision: the group has available to it a base and numerous personnel and the organizers are possessed of boundless energy and initiative. But on the other hand, fully dividing the work groups according to research subjects will, in our opinion, not change the existing state of affairs and will not eliminate the segregation of the work. This leads to a rejection of attempts to fill in the "blank spaces" and a lack of attention to worker, rural and creative young people; it will contribute to the dominance of local interests. Narrow, bureaucratic interest limits the research themes and precludes a broader look at the inter-relationship of the various state and public organizations. This despite the knowledge that military-patriotic education of the rising generation is an integral process involving the impact of all the state and public organizations and every aspect of our life.

Coordination of research in the field of military-patriotic education of young people within the framework of the academies of sciences, ministries and departments is an important undertaking but it still has not replaced the All-Union coordination which has become a function of the social council.

"The administrative, and above all the planning, work," said the CC CPSU review report to the 25th Congress, "must be aimed at the end national economy results."³ A survey of the leading specialists in military-patriotic education revealed three very urgent practical problems: the history and perspectives of the development of military-patriotic education, the effectiveness of the means of ideological influence in the field of military-patriotic education and the training of young people for service in the armed forces. Three research committees which are addressing these problems are charged with the task of carrying out in the shortest possible time a pooling of the efforts of the country's scientists, irrespective of their specialty and research subject. In 3-4 years, after obtaining replies to the questions asked, we will be able to set up new research committees to resolve the pressing problems at hand.

On 11 February 1977 there took place a meeting of the Public Council for Coordination of Scientific Research on Problems of Communist Youth Education under CC LYCLSU and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences USSR. At the meeting approval was given for a coordination plan for the country's scientific research.

To focus attention and interest on the important themes of military-patriotic education of youth, the section plan (for 1976-1980) calls for the publication of anthologies of articles on the structure of the appropriate research committees tasked with gathering authors' collectives from all corners of the Soviet Union. The first anthology, "The History and Perspectives of the Development of Military-Patriotic Education," will generalize the work

experience, content, and forms and analyze the organization and features of military-patriotic education at each historical stage of the Soviet state's development. The anthology "The Komsomol and the Army" will employ empirical research to shed light on the training of young people for defense of the motherland and it will examine the impact of military-patriotic work on the development of the qualities of civic-mindedness in the rising generation. "Art and Military-Patriotic Education" will show how the subject of war, the army and the military calling is illuminated in modern cinema and literature and on television and radio and it will analyze the effectiveness of the various means of exerting an ideological influence on military-patriotic education. A book which will become a great generalizing work is "Military-Patriotic Education: Theory, Systems, Experience and Effectiveness" under the general editorship of G. V. Sredin. A collection of standard research methods is in preparation. It is planned to devote a number of anthologies to the pressing problems of military-patriotic education of working, rural, school and student youth, etc.

In the CC CPSU review report to the 25th Congress L. I. Brezhnev said: "One of the most important tasks of the party was and is affirmation in the consciousness of the workers and, most of all the younger generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the Country of the Soviets and in our motherland, and a readiness to stand up in defense of the achievements of socialism."⁴

Coordination of research of a military-patriotic character is in the mainstream of the most important national economy tasks. Its aim is to achieve high quality and effectiveness of scientific research on the problem of training of the call-up contingents and military-patriotic youth education as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 75.
2. Ibid, p 79.
3. Ibid, p 59.
4. Ibid, p 75.

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READERS' CONFERENCES HELD IN THE CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES

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[Article by Lt Col A. Yakovlev: "At the Readers' Conferences--in the Central Group of Forces"]

[Text] In the closing days of March the Central Group of Forces held three readers' conferences of the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

The first of these conferences was held in the motorized rifle regiment. Maj Gen V. A. Matsulenko, editor-in-chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL delivered a report on the work of the editorial staff and the editorial board.

Taking part in the discussion of the report were many officers of the regiment. Lt Col Yu. F. Shchepin said that a great deal of interest was aroused by the articles dealing with the problems stemming from the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the CC CPSU decree on "The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution." Constant use of these materials is being made in the political classwork. He asked the editorial staff to publish more materials on the tactics of the subunits [podrazdeleniya] and units [chasti] in the various types of combat engagements. Capt Ye. G. Nikitenko said that he was especially pleased with V. Kirsanov's article "The National Liberation War and the Rout of Foreign Intervention in Angola" (1977, No 3) and N. Glazunov's article "The Development of the Structure of the Ground Forces of the Bundeswehr (1955-1974)" (1974, No 12). These articles were used by the propaganda workers for conversations with the soldiers. He would like, said Captain Nikitenko, to see the journal publish more frequent materials on the work experience of the Leninist rooms, the museums of combat glory and the officers' clubs in the matter of military-patriotic and internationalist education.

Capt Yu. A. Bessolov expressed a desire to see more frequent publication of articles on the party political work in the various types of combat engagements (in the attack, on the march, in defense, etc.), on the Russian military commanders, on the development of domestic models of equipment and weapons and on the scientists who have made their contribution to this important work.

"I have long been a reader of the journal," said Lt Col K. R. Bogirokov. "It helps in propaganda work. More than 20 officers and ensigns of our regiment are regular subscribers to the journal and 50 persons borrowed it from the library this year alone. My wishes would be: to expand the coverage of party and political work in the regiment and battalion; to explain in more detail why a certain variant and not another of a decision for the conduct of an operation was made during the war; to provide more extensive description of the marauding plans of the German Fascists."

The second reader conference was held at the Mlada-Boleslavskiy garrison. In his talk Lt Col Ye. I. Morozov took note of a number of fine articles, including D. Volkogonov's "The 25th CPSU Congress and the Problems of Ideological Struggle" (1976, No 5), and A. Milovidov's "The Growth of the Role of the Morale Factor in War" (1977, No 3), and he expressed a wish for the publication of more materials on the party and political work of the regiment-battalion link. Lt V. A. Grigor'yev, who spoke next, mentioned several articles which he feels are valuable aids in the work of any propagandist. These were Maj Gen D. Volkogonov's article "The 25th CPSU Congress and the Problems of Ideological Struggle" (1976, No 5) and A. Bukov's "The 25th CPSU Congress on Ideological and Educational Work" (1976, No 6). "Yu. Mel'nikov's article 'A Potent Instrumentality for Increasing the Combat Readiness of the Troops' (1976, No 2) helped me and my subordinates," he said, "to obtain a more profound understanding of the role of socialist competition and to employ it for solution of the problems assigned in the winter instruction period. Of great instructional value to the soldiers are the materials in the column 'In the Brotherly Armies.' This is especially important for those of us who are serving beyond the borders of the motherland. We welcomed, for example, I. Kulikov's article 'A History of the Evolution of Soviet-Czech Combat Cooperation' (1977, No 3). I would like," the speaker went on to say, "to see more articles on the Russian military commanders and the heroism of the ordinary soldier, who has always borne the chief burden of war on his shoulders."

Capt N. P. Uzhviyev took note of the instructive value of V. Kulikov's article "The Pressing Problems of Military History in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" (1976, No 13), A. Milovidov's "The Growth of the Role of the Morale Factor in War" (1977, No 3), P. Golub's "V. I. Lenin's Preparation of the Party's 1905-1907 Military Program" (1976, No 1), P. Bobylev's "The Role of the Western Front in the Period of the Defeat of Kolchak" (1976, No 1) and I. Yakubovskiy's "The 25th CPSU Congress and the Strengthening of the Military Cooperation of the Warsaw Pact Countries" (1976, No 8). At the same time Uzhviyev asked the collective of the editorial staff to prepare more materials on the combat collaboration of the Warsaw Pact member countries and to describe the work of instruction of the personnel of the collaborating armies. In his speech Capt L. R. Kornitskiy exposed the aggressive character of imperialism and the bourgeois falsifiers of history. He noted V. Rodin's article "The Anti-Hitlerite Coalition" (1977, No 1) and L. Kruglov's "The International Military and Historical Conference in Iran" (1977, No 1). These articles provide a vivid

and convincing discussion on those who deviate from historical truth, which in some measure vindicates the organizers in World War II. Captain Kornitskiy's wishes essentially entail a request that the journal offer more methods councils and that it provide information on how to make the best use of the tactical combat episodes and examples of the period of the Great Patriotic War in the conduct of party and political work under modern conditions.

Col A. G. Dvorichenko addressed great and interesting subjects of military history. He noted that the conduct of tactical studies and lessons entails the creation of many situations similar to the situations of the Great Patriotic War. Hence, it is necessary to make more skillful use of the experience of the past war and to put complex theoretical problems into practice. The speaker said that the journal can do a great deal for inculcation in the soldiers of a feeling of pride in their kind of troops. At the same time he asked that the journal tell in its pages how to cultivate in the soldiers the best of the qualities possessed by the fighting men in the last war and what needs to be done to make the experience of the past accessible to all the personnel. Colonel Dvorichenko also asked the editorial board to publish more articles on such urgent questions as analysis of the preparation of the offensive and defensive operations appropriate to the time, the raids and the in-depth maneuvers of mobile troops in the Great Patriotic War, and the achievement of accelerated rates of advance of troops and restoration of their combat efficiency in the course of a battle.

The third readers' conference was conducted with the officers of the staff and political section and directorate of the TsGV [Central Group of Forces]. It was opened by Maj Gen V. M. Kozhbakhteyev, chief of staff of the Group of Forces. He made a brief but thorough analysis of the work of the journal, accorded it a favorable rating and spoke about the need for a more profound determination of the objective laws and trends relating to the development of the art of war and the need for the drawing of lessons from the past for purposes of interpreting the present and predicting the future. Taking part in the work of the conference were Lt Gen V. F. Bukharenko, TsGV deputy commander-in-chief for combat training, and Col G. K. Valuyskikh, chief of the political section of the TsGV staff and directorate.

Col A. A. Lyashenko's speech was received with interest. He praised D. Volkogonov and A. Bukov's articles as well as Ye. Rybkin's "The 25th CPSU Congress and the Problem of Peaceful Coexistence of Socialism and Capitalism" (1977, No 1). This officer wanted the editorial collective to give more attention to internationalist education of the personnel and to publish more materials on the reciprocal relations of the TsGV and the ChNA [Czech People's Army] and on the moral and psychological training of the fighting men.

Maj V. I. Kosov asked the journal to publish materials about the courage of the motor vehicle drivers during the war, about their love for the equipment and about motor vehicle logistics. He took note of the article

of N. Azovtsev, S. Gusareviche's "The Leninist Principles of Strategic Leadership" (1977, No 1), N. Kalutskiy's "The Action of the Rifle Battalion for Capture and Retention of the Vistula Base" (1977, No 1), S. Pechenenko's "The Crossing of the River by the Rifle Division and the Battle for the Base" (1977, No 2), A. Mikoyan's "In the Days of the Blockade" (1977, No 2) and V. Markov's "Fidelity to Military Duty" (1977, No 3).

Service beyond the native borders, said Maj N. S. Golubkin, imposes a great responsibility on us, the soldiers of the TsGV. Joint exercises and classes with the ChNA troops give persuasive evidence that our strength lies in unity and solidarity. It is therefore natural to ask that the journal give more coverage to the combat cooperation of the Warsaw Pact countries and the work of the joint exercises and meetings of the soldiers of the brotherly armies.

Capt V. D. Frolov devoted his speech to a review of journal articles exposing the falsifiers of history and he asked that more attention be given to this important theme.

Maj Gen Ye. A. Zhidkov wanted the journal's editorial board to concentrate more attention on the urgent problems of the art of war (breach of a defense, pursuit involving crossing of water barriers, meeting engagements, etc.) and research on little-known operations and battles. He took note of some fine articles, including N. Dunayeva's "Lend-Lease: Facts and Fancies" (1977, No 3) and V. Kirsanov's "The National Liberation War and the Rout of Foreign Intervention in Angola" (1977, No 3). Lt Gen V. F. Bukharenko expressed a desire for more detailed information on the events of the prewar years and the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, for articles describing the heroism of the Soviet people and exposing the falsifiers of history, and for reviews of motion pictures on military themes.

At the conclusion of the conference the editor-in-chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL thanked all the speakers for their expressed views and good wishes and gave assurance that they would all be carefully studied by the editorial board and given consideration in future work.

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SENIOR OFFICERS ON VICTORY DAY

Deputy Defense Minister Alekseyev

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 9 May 77 p 3

[Article by Engr. Col Gen N. Alekseyev, USSR deputy minister of defense:
"A Mighty Arsenal"]

[Excerpts] The falsifiers of history have been trying up to now with all their power to belittle the importance of our country's military economy in the defeat of fascist Germany and to overstate the role of the United States and England and their deliveries under Lend Lease. Without a doubt, these deliveries had a certain importance. However, if you compare their volume with the scale of Soviet military production, it becomes evident that they could not have had a material effect on the war's progress and result. For example, during the last year of the war, Lend Lease deliveries were less than three percent of our own production.

The Great Patriotic War was the grimmest of wars ever experienced by our motherland. It ended with a great victory because socialism and the Communist Party's consistent policy ensured the indestructible unity of all Soviet society, the might and unprecedented mobility of its economy, and the high development of military science. Today, on the Day of Victory, on this holiday of national glory, all of us again and again express our gratitude to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War who protected the honor and independence of the socialist motherland. We bow our heads to the shining memory of its brave sons and daughters who gave their lives on the fields of unprecedented battles which accomplished the great victory.

The lessons of the past war teach the peoples of the world to be very vigilant. The military danger, which proceeds from imperialism, endures. Our Leninist party regards the defense of the socialist motherland and the strengthening of the country's defenses and the combat might of the Soviet armed forces as its sacred duty. Along with this, comrade L. I. Brezhnev the general secretary of the CC CPSU, in his speech at the solemn meeting devoted to presenting a Gold Star medal to the hero city of Tula, pointed

out that "Our great people are absorbed in peaceful and constructive work. They are engaged in a task of enormous scope and historical importance. They do not want the threat of war to press with such a heavy weight. The 25th Congress charged the party's Central Committee to increase its efforts steadily in the struggle for a firm peace."

Political Directorate Deputy Sredin

Moscow UCHITEL'SKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 May 77 p 1

[Article by Col Gen G . V. Sredin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The People's Heroic Deed"]

[Excerpts] A total of 30 years have passed since the volleys of the salute to the Day of Victory died away. Enormous changes have occurred during that time in the world. The victory over fascism was an historical frontier in the destinies of all mankind. Its most profound consequences were the formation of a world socialist system, the present successes of world socialism, and the steady growth of revolutionary forces. As a result of the growing might of the USSR and the other countries in the socialist commonwealth and their consistent peace-loving foreign policy, during recent years they have managed to achieve notable successes in normalizing the planet's political climate. At the same time, it is impossible not to take into account the fact that imperialism's aggressive circles are stubbornly resisting the relaxation process and are intensifying the arms race. Under these conditions, our party proceeds from the indivisibility of the tasks of strengthening peace and the country's defenses.

New generations of young defenders of the motherland have replaced veterans in the combat formation of the Soviet armed forces. They are carrying on and increasing the heroic traditions of older generations, of those who raised the Victory Banner over the Reichstag. Today, our Soviet armed forces in a united combat formation with the armies of fraternal socialist countries are vigilantly guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the security of the socialist commonwealth, and peace and quiet in the world.

The army and navy of the Soviet state are surrounded by the deep love and concern of all the people. The party and government are doing everything necessary so that the motherland's defenders will have the most modern weapons and contemporary combat equipment and broad opportunities to increase their ideological, professional and cultural level. Skilfully mastering formidable weapons, learning military jobs in a real way, responding to the party's concern for strengthening the country's defensive capabilities with irreproachable service, greeting the 60th anniversary of Great October with fitting deeds--all our fighting men are now living with these aspirations.

Army and navy personnel are greeting the victory holiday with successes in combat and political training and in growing field, air and naval training.

The armed defenders are successfully solving the main task assigned the armed forces by the 25th Party Congress--to be a guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and a bulwark for universal peace. Socialist competition to greet the 60th anniversary of October in a fitting manner is flaring up ever brighter in the districts, groups of forces and fleets.

The spiritual bond between our army and the great Soviet people is strong and unbreakable. The Soviet army is a magnificent school of life for young patriots. It is a school of diligence and discipline. It is a school of courage. Young people, who are taking their first independent steps on life's pathway, arrive in the soldier family. People, who are deeply aware of their duty to the motherland, who are physically hardened, who have received not only military training but also the technical knowledge and professions needed to work in the national economy, return from the army.

The Soviet school, teacher collectives, and school Komsomol and Pioneer organizations make an important contribution to the military and patriotic indoctrination of the rising generation and to the indoctrination of future fighting men.

Studying the ABC's of military affairs during basic military training classes, visits by students from military units, familiarity with combat equipment, correspondence with school graduates who have been called to active duty--all this and much more inculcates love for the Soviet army and navy and prepares young people for future service in the armed forces. All this forms in the students the knowledge, ability and habits necessary to successfully carry out the military oath. It molds experiences of patriotic conduct and develops an active and vital position.

The Soviet people and their armed defenders are celebrating the glorious victory holiday with an enormous work and political upsurge which has been evoked by implementing the plans of the 25th CPSU Congress and by preparing for the 60th anniversary of October. The Soviet people, a heroic and courageous people, are carrying on high the Leninist banner, the banner of Great October, which is covered with glory.

Turkestan MD Commander Belonozhko

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 9 May 77 p 2

[Article by Col Gen S. Ye. Belonozhko, commander of forces in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "The Heroic Deed of the People and the Army"]

[Excerpts] The implementation of the plans for the construction of communism is inseparably linked with the preservation and strengthening of peace. The CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet government, and comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the CC CPSU general secretary, personally, are persistently conducting the peace-loving foreign policy course put forward by the 25th CPSU Congress.

However, reactionary imperialist forces are showing violent resistance to the relaxation process. They are stirring up the activity of the NATO and CENTO aggressive blocs. The imperialists are creating and maintaining hotbeds of tension and war in various areas of the world.

Considering all this, the 25th CPSU Congress came to the conclusion that although the opportunities for aggressive actions by imperialism have been significantly curtailed, its nature remains as before. In connection with this, the CPSU and the Soviet government are displaying constant concern for the Soviet Union's defensive capabilities and for strengthening the army and navy. Today, the armed forces have in their armament the best nuclear missile weapons in the world, new tanks, artillery and numerous items of specialized equipment. The ground forces are completely motorized and armor-clad. The Air Force and the Navy, whose basis is nuclear missile submarines, have also changed beyond recognition.

While attaching enormous importance to the technical equipping of the forces, our party considers that the main force in a war has been and remains the individual, that the decisive factors in the combat might of the Soviet armed forces are people--the cadres in the command, political and engineer elements and our outstanding soldiers, sergeants, and warrant officers.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government display a fatherly concern for military cadres and their indoctrination and training.

The armed forces are a guard over the peaceful labor of our people and a bulwark of universal peace. Soviet fighting men fuse their military work into a unified whole with the labor of all the people. They recognize what enormous importance their successes in performing military service, in studying military affairs, and in maintaining vigilance and combat readiness have for the construction of communism.

Today, the Day of Victory is noted for the spreading preparation for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution--the outstanding holiday of our country's people and of all progressive humanity. Our motherland's workers and army and navy fighting men are greeting the glorious jubilee of Great October with new successes in the struggle to implement the historical decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and to complete the Tenth Five-Year Plan successfully.

The Turkestan fighting men, who have joined in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October are tirelessly improving their combat and political training. They are increasing their vigilance and strengthening discipline and organization. They are reliably protecting the accomplishments of the socialist revolution and the conscientious work of the Soviet people. They are vigilantly standing guard over the motherland's borders.

Political Directorate Deputy Sobolev

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 8 May 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Gen M. Sobolev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "An Immortal Exploit"]

[Excerpts] As is emphasized in the CC CPSU resolution, "Concerning the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," a profound reorganization is taking place in the entire system of international relations. It is based on the fundamental changes in the relationship of forces in the world. As a result of the consistent implementation of the Peace Program, put forward by the CPSU and representing the agreed to foreign policy program of all Warsaw Treaty countries, powerful positive changes have taken place and are taking place in the world arena. During recent years, a shift has managed to be achieved from the "cold war" to a relaxing of tensions and towards the affirmation of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems in international practices. The threat of a world-wide thermonuclear war has managed to be moved aside. The Soviet Union is doing everything, which depends upon it, to attach a universal and irreversible nature to the relaxation process.

Meanwhile, the lessons from the Great Patriotic War compel us to be constantly vigilant with respect to imperialism. The war once again corroborated the great vital force of the Leninist instructions concerning strengthening the country's defensive might and maintaining the army and navy in constant combat readiness.

Numerous facts and events in contemporary international life show convincingly that, although the opportunities for aggressive actions by imperialism have been curtailed, its nature remains as before. The military danger has not been eliminated.

The Soviet armed forces have always come forward as a mighty factor for preserving and strengthening peace and for averting the bloody wars embodied by international imperialism. They are also performing this noble historical mission today along with the other armies of the socialist commonwealth which are included in the Warsaw Treaty. Soviet fighting men unanimously support the domestic and foreign policy of the party and Soviet government. They eagerly and with their whole heart approve the untiring activity of the CPSU Central Committee, of the Central Committee, Politburo, and of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CC CPSU, himself, in further improving the economic and defensive might of our motherland.

The Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner Voluntary Society for Cooperation With the Armed Forces (DOSAAF USSR)--Soviet people's mass defense and patriotic organization--is making an invaluable contribution to the cause of strengthening the country's defensive capabilities and increasing

the combat power of the Soviet armed forces. It is sufficient to say that today every third inductee, before he joins the ranks of the motherland's armed defenders, undergoes training in one of the training organizations of the defense society. He becomes a radio operator, a mechanic, a driver, a motorcyclist, that is, he acquires one or two specialties needed by him during military service.

The military technical forms of sports cultivated in DOSAAF play a large role in the physical training of the future fighting men.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War demonstrates in a convincing way that there are no forces in the world which could smash socialism and bring to their knees a people who are faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, who are devoted to the socialist motherland, and who are united around the Leninist party. The results of the Great Patriotic War are at the same time a formidable warning to imperialist aggressors and a stern and unforgettable lesson of history.

Central Asian Deputy Gorcharkov

Alma Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 77 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Gen V. Gorchakov, first deputy commander of forces in the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Eternal Fire of the Heroic Deed"]

[Excerpts] Now, as was pointed out during the 25th CPSU Congress, a developed socialist society, which is growing into a communist one, has been built in our country. The Soviet state has become public. A new historical community of people--the Soviet people at whose basis lie the unbreakable union of the working class, the peasants and the intelligentsia under the leadership of the working class and the friendship of all nations and nationalities within the country--has taken shape. The Soviet Union has attained high frontiers in creating the material and technical base for communism. The economic and defensive might of our socialist motherland has grown. The people of all the planet see in the country of the soviets a bulwark for peace.

At the present time, as never before, the international position of the Soviet Union is strong. For more than 30 years our people have labored under a peaceful sky. The CPSU's Leninist foreign policy course serves the fundamental interests of the workers in all countries.

At the same time the Communist Party takes into consideration the fact that influential militaristic circles in a number of Western countries are opposed to the relaxation of international tensions and are continuing the arms race. This continuing military danger evokes the necessity to be tirelessly concerned about strengthening our country's defensive capabilities,

increasing the might of the armed forces, and maintaining them in constant combat readiness.

During recent years, the equipment of the armed forces has been improved with modern weapons and combat equipment. The quality of combat training and the ideological training of the men has been raised. Our armed forces have become even more vigilant and powerful. They have been raised to a higher level of combat training and combat readiness. They firmly and unwaveringly follow the path pointed out by the party and its Leninist Central Committee.

The 25th CPSU Congress determined new important and critical tasks in the area of strengthening our socialist motherland's defenses, and further developing and improving the armed forces. The fighting men of the Soviet army were responding to the decisions of the congress with increased activity in combat and political training and in socialist competition.

To wholeheartedly serve the cause of the Communist Party and the Soviet people! To always be at high combat readiness! To carry out to the end any order pertaining to the defense of the beloved motherland's sacred frontiers! These words of the sacred oath solemnly sounded from the high podium of the 25th CPSU Congress during the welcoming address to the delegates from the USSR's armed forces. Soviet fighting men-- the heirs of Great October-- are faithful to the end to this vow to the party, the people and the socialist motherland.

8802

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SENIOR OFFICERS ON BORDER GUARDS DAY

Deputy Chief Comments

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 28 May 77 p 4

[Article by Engr-Maj Gen G. Preobrazhenskiy, Deputy Chief of Border Troops, State Security Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers: "Guarding the Borders of the Homeland"]

[Excerpts] Our homeland is immense. Its borders stretch more than 60,000 kilometers, through the dense taiga forest, across the shifting sands of the Karakum, along the steep mountain slopes of the Pamir, across the tundra plains beyond the Arctic Circle, along rivers, seas and oceans. Day and night, in all weather, border guard patrols march along frontier trails, border guard ships patrol coastal waters, while helicopters and airplanes patrol the air. For 59 years now, since 28 May 1918, when V. I. Lenin signed the Council of People's Commissars decree establishing the border guards, the men in the green caps have been standing continuous guard over the borders of the USSR.

These have been years of incessant struggle against intrigues by our enemies along the Soviet borders. The combat skill of our fighting men has grown in this struggle, their will has been toughened, and they have developed unbending firmness. Our border guards learned to defeat not by sheer weight of numbers but rather by skill.

Today's generation of border guards has great respect for the heroes of the struggle against saboteurs and spies, counterrevolutionary robber bands and smugglers of all hues and shades, as well as seekers of military adventure who have attempted by force of arms to probe the strength of our borders. The border guards have entered an endless number of deeds in their fighting chronicle.

Today there are approximately 100 subunits in the border troops bearing the names of valiant border guards. Each name represents an outstanding example of courage and heroism and selfless service to the homeland, party, and people.

The sons and grandsons of those men who fought the enemy during the war years are serving today on the border. Just as the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, they are totally dedicated to Communist ideals, ready and willing to stand up for the interests of the Soviet homeland, and are highly vigilant.

In recent years the border troops have experienced considerable qualitative changes. Today the men are armed with modern combat equipment and weapons, fast ships, airplanes and helicopters, radar and signaling devices, powerful optical instruments and other means of detection.

Not only the technical equipment and capability to detect and detain illegal border crossers have changed. The men guarding the border have changed as well. Young men with a high general educational level, possessing technical knowledge, and many with work skills as well, are joining the border troops. The military and political training level of commanders and political workers has risen, and command of units and subunits has improved. Party-political work is being performed in a vigorous and purposeful manner.

Great changes are also taking place in living conditions for our border guards. Border troop garrison facilities are becoming more attractive, border outposts are receiving better facilities, and spacious, attractive new housing is going up, fully suited to local climatic conditions and the specific features of border guard service.

The defenders of our borders have greeted their holiday with excellent performance results. The ranks of outstanding performers have grown, and the number of excellent-rated subunits and ships has increased. Based on last year's results, the Border Troops Military Council awarded challenge red banners to outstanding units. They include a detachment in the town of Przheval'sk, which initiated socialist competition in honor of the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Border guard service is combat duty. Our border guards stand face to face with the capitalist world. And that world, as we know, is continuing its attempts to send agents into our country and to conduct intensive intelligence gathering.

Carrying out the demands of the party, commanders, political agencies and party organizations in the units are instilling a high degree of political awareness in our border troops, are toughening them ideologically, and developing the ability to evaluate from a class standpoint the events which are occurring and the situation arising on the border.

The daily routine of our border troops is filled with intense military labor, demanding of them vigilance, decision of actions, and courage. The majority of enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and officers possess these qualities to perfection and display them in their daily service.

In a certain border sector an illegal border crosser had managed to penetrate deep. Physically powerful and well trained, he skillfully concealed his tracks. In order to spot him, in order to avoid losing the trail, the border guards were compelled to utilize not only sophisticated equipment but also an old and tested assistant -- the tracking dog. Experienced instructor Sr Sgt V. Kukhol' conducted the search skillfully, a pursuit which lasted several hours. Thanks to his efforts, as well as the skill displayed by the border guard detail of Sr Sgt D. Lysov, the illegal border crosser was caught.

This is merely one of the many routine situations which have occurred on the border. But it characterizes the intensity of border guard service and indicates the high degree of responsibility placed on the men guarding our homeland.

In their service our border guards constantly rely on the assistance of the local populace and members of the volunteer police auxiliary. In frontier villages and kolkhozes one frequently encounters a worker or kolkhoz farmer, a Pioneer or schoolchild who has been awarded the "For Distinction in Guarding the State Borders of the USSR" medal or "Excellent Border Guard" badge. Soviet patriots come to the assistance of the border troops at the first call, and frequently they capture border violators on their own.

The border is being guarded by the entire people. The border troops are proud of their friendship with the toilers of the frontier areas and make every effort to strengthen it. This friendship is a guarantee that nobody will ever succeed in violating our sacred borders unpunished.

Our border guards continuously bear in mind the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress to the effect that it is necessary to display vigilance toward the intrigues of imperialism and to increase combat readiness. Therefore the fighting men of our border are always vigilant, always on guard.

The border troops owe their achieved success in guarding the border, in personnel training and indoctrination to the constant attention shown by the Communist Party and Soviet Government. Celebrating their anniversary, our border guards assure the party and Soviet people that they will continue in the future working tirelessly to improve their combat skills and reliably guard the borders of the homeland.

Chief of Central Asian Border District

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 28 May 77 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen I. Karpov, Commanding General of the Red-Banner Central Asian Border District: "Guarding the Borders of the Homeland"]

[Excerpts] Continuing the glorious fighting traditions, the present generation of border guards is serving selflessly.

Reactionary circles in many capitalist countries are attempting, under the cover of slanderous fabrications about a "Soviet military threat," to stand in the way of positive changes in international relations, are escalating the arms race, are increasing military budgets, and are maintaining focal points of tension in various parts of the world. Speaking in Tula, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "The lessons of the past war call for our vigilance.... There exist aggressive forces which are not standing idle. We must not forget this."

Soviet border guards employ a flawless weapon against the arsenal of thoroughly-elaborated provocations, espionage techniques, and devices of brainwashing, bribery and blackmail -- a high degree of Cheka vigilance, political maturity, and a feeling of personal responsibility for dependable protection of the borders of the socialist homeland.

Thanks to the concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the border troops have changed qualitatively in recent years. Today they are armed with modern automatic weapons, and they have at their disposal helicopters and airplanes, high-speed patrol craft, the most advanced communications gear, optoelectronic equipment and signaling devices. More than 90 percent of all personnel are Komsomol members. Their high level of political awareness, knowledge of their jobs, and discipline serve as an example for all personnel.

One of the best subunits in the district is the border crossing station under the command of officer V. A. Sartakov. This excellent team works smoothly and with precision. Warrant officer N. Parkhomenko alone has caught dozens of would-be smugglers and has confiscated large quantities of anti-Soviet and religious literature, which imperialist subversive ideological agencies were attempting to smuggle into our country by various means.

More than 600 civilian volunteers have received commendations from the district command in recent years for personal bravery and ingenuity displayed in detaining illegal border crossers and violators of border procedures.

Establishment by the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and the Republic Council of Ministers of challenge red banners for border units of this district which have achieved the best results in service, combat and political training constituted one more manifestation of the growing friendship between the border troops and the civilian populace of the frontier areas, as well as the great concern by party and Soviet bodies to strengthen the security of the state borders of the USSR. The Komsomol Central Committees of the Central Asian republics also instituted red banners for the top Komsomol organizations of the units. Units which have been awarded this high honor by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan and the republic Council of Ministers include the Kaakhkinskiy Red-Banner Border Detachment.

The border post imeni Leonid Kravchenko was awarded the red banner of Turkmenistan Komsomol.

The soldiers of this district are witnesses to the persistence with which the Soviet people are carrying out the party's historic plans and to the unprecedented heights reached by the prestige of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community in the international arena. Ideologically convinced and totally dedicated to the party and people, to the ideals of communism and proletarian internationalism, the Soviet border guards, together with the fighting men of the Armed Forces and with our brothers in arms in the socialist countries, are vigilantly standing guard over the achievements of the Great October Revolution, prepared to defend them with weapon in hand against the encroachments of any and all aggressors.

Deputy Chief of Eastern Border District

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 27 May 77 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen Yu. Nitsyn, Deputy Chief of the Red-Banner Eastern Border District: "Sentinels of the Sacred Borders"]

[Excerpts] Tomorrow is Border Guard Day

The war is over. But a front of struggle against the secret enemies of the USSR remains and continues to operate. On the border events occur even in peacetime which demand of our fighting men a high degree of specialized training, combat skill, and stamina. The workdays of the border service are filled with examples of excellent vigilance and personnel courage. I shall relate an episode which took place at one of our border posts.

...Late one night, while checking the plowed border strip, Pfc Ovsyannikov spotted several tracks and immediately reported this fact to the outpost. The alert was sounded, and a party headed by Senior Sergeant Glushchenko soon arrived at the spot. They proceeded to pursue the illegal border crossers. Glushchenko's party reached a wide, swift-flowing river. Party member Glushchenko was the first to jump into the icy water and swim across. The other men followed him. Within a few hours the border violators were apprehended.

Thanks to constant concern by the party and Soviet Government, the border troops are today armed with modern weapons, combat and special equipment. They have everything they need to ensure that any spy who attempts to test the integrity of the Soviet border will be apprehended or rendered harmless.

The Central Committee of the Kirgiz Communist Party and the republic Council of Ministers devote considerable attention to guarding the country's borders. Personnel of party, Soviet and Komsomol organizations as well as

representatives of work forces participate in training and indoctrination of border guards. We should note in particular the concern shown for the men by our patrons -- the work forces at the Kirgiz Worsted-Textile Combine, the Przheval'sk Electrical Equipment Plant, and the Osh Cotton Textile Combine.

The strength of the border troops lies in a strong friendship with the populace. Soviet citizens consider it to be their patriotic duty to assist us in guarding the border. Civilian police auxiliary headquarters in border areas do a good job of supervising the police auxiliaries.

The 25th CPSU Congress highly praised the activities of state security agencies and troops. This praise for their military labor inspires the men and places a great obligation on them. The border troops have initiated extensive socialist competition at border outposts and in the subunits in honor of the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution. The men of the Przheval'sk border detachment initiated this competition in the border troops of the USSR. This patriotic initiative has earned widespread support in all units and subunits. The border guards are resolved to meet their tough pledges.

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DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET AIRBORNE TANKS DESCRIBED

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[Article by Lieutenant Col K. Erhart: "Combat Machine of the Paratroopers"]

[Text] Major maneuver "Dvina" 1970: The skies were full of parachutes. Some 8,000 paratroopers and 160 combat vehicles descended within only 22 minutes. Along with the ASU-57 one saw here the first specimens of the third generation of modern Soviet airborne tanks, type BMD, the combat machine of the paratroopers.

The maneuver was still classified, because the combat vehicle was being tested by the troops. Three years later, at the Moscow military parade in honor of the October Revolution, the blue berets marched across Red Square with the BMD...

Thirty years before, the airborne brigades of the Red Army, armed only with light infantry weapons, were faced with difficult assignments. They had to intervene in the winter offensive of 1941-1942. The 4th Airborne Corps was set down in the area of Vyasna/Smolensk. Some 10,000 men attacked the enemy from behind and thereby made their contribution to the great turn of the tide in World War II. General of the Army Margelov, chief of the Soviet airborne troops, presented details of that operation in his historical reflections on the development of the young branch of service: "For a whole series of reasons, including the limited capacity of our air force, the landing of this corps took place only during the night and in several stages. In the course of the first 6 days--from 27 January to 2 February 1942--the 8th airborne brigade was dropped. From 18 to 23 February parts of the 9th and the 214th brigade followed. In all more than 10 nights were required to land the corps."

The maneuver "Dvina" demonstrated the sharp upward development since the war: 8,000 men with automatic weapons and 160 armed combat vehicles on parachutes, plus heavy combat equipment such as howitzers, mortars, motor vehicles, and heavy SFL's [self-propelled gun carriages] by conventional landing--in 22 minutes! Delivered from a distance of over 1,000 km by modern AN-12 and AN-22 large transport planes. Combat was initiated in

motion. With this equipment and fire power the airborne troops perform both tactical and strategic missions in the enemy's rear.

Building on the experiments of the pre-war period and conclusions drawn from the use of paratroopers in the war, the efforts of the Soviet airborne troops in expanding and modernizing their operations concentrate on combat vehicles answering specific requirements.

The first "flying tank" was the ASU-57, an SFL capable of being dropped by parachute, with a high capacity for maneuvering and negotiating terrain. Because of its small combat mass, the vehicle is very fast. Its low silhouette makes it a very difficult target.

The ASU-57 has been part of the armament of the Soviet airborne troops since 1949. For a long time it was the only airborne tank that could be dropped by parachute. With it the jumping paratroopers possess from the first moment, without waiting for transport planes to land, a combat vehicle with high fire power which effectively supports the conquest and annihilation of the nuclear weapons, depots, missile sites, airports, railroad junctions, and other targets in the enemy's hinterland. When dropped by parachute the vehicle is tied to a cargo platform equipped with apparatus to absorb the shock of the landing. The untying takes only a few minutes, so that the crew can be combat-ready in the shortest time. The ASU-57 can also be transported by helicopter. The tank's armament consists of a 57-mm cannon and a machine gun mounted to the left of it. The cannon has a rate of fire of 6 to 10 shots per minute. The maximum range is 6,000 m for fragmentation shells and 1,200 m for tank-tracer shells with direct aim. When dropped the cannon is braced over the front of the vehicle. The cannon has been repeatedly improved, so that various versions are known (recognizable by the muzzle brake).

The main assembly group is the armored hull, a welded construction of plates inclined forwards and backwards with vertical sides. To cut down on weight the back and floor are made of duralumin. The driver's front slants stepwise toward the front. To the left and right of the cannon observation slits are located, and in the front portion of the side walls of the combat area there are observation hatches which can be closed by flaps on the outside. The combat area is open on top and can be covered by a tarp. Further equipment includes infrared devices and radio equipment.

With a combat mass of 3.5 t the ASU-57 attains a maximum speed of 45 km/h on roads and 25 km/h over terrain.

A further step to increase the thrust and fire power of the airborne units was the introduction of the ASU-85. This armored vehicle, which cannot be dropped by parachute, was delivered to the troops in 1962. Its 85-mm long-barreled cannon was fitted with an effective muzzle brake and a smoke absorber (ejector). The vehicle is designed as a combat SFL. The gun is

not mounted on a turret. It is pointed sideways with the whole vehicle. Proven assembly groups of the PT-76 amphibious tank, such as the chassis, were used on the ASU-85. The hull is armored on all sides and leak-proof. The protective qualities of the armor are increased by the inclination of the sides. The paratroopers mount their "combat machine" through several hatches. The armament includes a machine gun besides the cannon. An infrared device supplements the equipment.

Barely 10 years after the introduction of this type, the Soviet military designers delivered the BMD to the airborne troops. The rich experience of long years of practice with its predecessors and other tanks entered into this model. The BMD is suitable for landing with and without parachute. It is amphibious like the BMP of the motorized rifle units. Its armament is also like that of the BMP--quick-firing cannon, launching apparatus for guided antitank missiles, and machine gun. The main armament is located in a turret. An additional two machine guns are located in front. That considerably increases its fighting characteristics. The armored hull has a very favorable form with a low silhouette. In addition to the crew there is space for six airborne soldiers. They can fight the enemy through loopholes.

The prominent identifying features are: chassis with five drive rollers and four support rollers, raised and pointed front with two machine guns in the corners, very flat turret, short stern, water-jet driving mechanism.

All in all the BMD represents a new quality in the heavy combat equipment of the airborne troops, with which they can perform their combat duties independently and in close cooperation with other branches of service. The new combat vehicle takes an honorable place in the series of weapons systems which will mark the Soviet Army in the coming decade.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 46. Combat machine of the paratroopers, so runs the translation from the Russian, BMD, Boyavaya Mashina Desantnaya. The new combat vehicle of the blue berets is the successful synthesis of an armored transport vehicle, an amphibious tank, and a self-propelled gun carriage. A vehicle for great demands.
2. p 49. Combat machine of the paratroopers: this has several meanings in view of this picture. The giant transport planes--here the Il-76--are also combat machines. They transport the airborne units with their heavy equipment thousands of kilometers to the area of operations.